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#### A. Interpretation - Economic Engagement is defined as expanding economic ties with a country to change its behavior – this means they have to be gov to gov

**Kahler, 6** - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego (M., “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait” in Journal of Peace Research (2006), 43:5, p. 523-541, Sage Publications)

Economic engagement - a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and improve bilateral political relations

#### ‘Its’ is a possessive pronoun showing ownership

**Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 2005** – (“Term: Possessive Pronoun,”

http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership.

EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

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#### Their security discourse is epistemologically flawed and replicates global power imbalances – this causes mass violence and turns the case.

**Ahmed 12** Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society" Global Change, Peace & Security Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011 Taylor Francis, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14781158.2011.601854#.UfV-kW3aVos)//A-Berg

3. From securitisation to militarisation 3.1 Complicity

This analysis thus calls for a broader approach to environmental security based on retrieving the manner in which political actors construct discourses of 'scarcity' in response to ecological, energy and economic crises (critical security studies) in the context of the historically-specific socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted, and which are often implicated in the acceleration of these very crises (historical sociology and historical materialism). Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conflictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable to address the relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics. Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale - in the very process of seeking security.85 In Cox's words, because positivist IR theory 'does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it'.86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason -thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence. Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises. By the same token, the incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military-political power rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nullified under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to 'securitise' them - and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conflict and militarisation responsible for magnified global insecurity. 'Securitisation' refers to a 'speech act' - an act of labelling - whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of 'security', therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper 'dual' structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military-police measures in purported response to an existential danger. The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating 'new security challenges', and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains to examine is on the 'surface' of the international system (geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on), phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms. Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to 'new security challenges' such as 'low-intensity' intra-state conflicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafficking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such 'new security challenges' are non-military in origin - whether their referents are states or individuals - the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the lenses of military-political power.92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring urgent transformation, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military-political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on.93 Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed (given that state power itself is constituted by these structures) deserve protection. This justifies the state's adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations - rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism. Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential 'threat-multipliers' of traditional security issues such as 'political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens'. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources. The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a 'stress-multiplier' that will 'exacerbate tensions' and 'complicate American foreign policy'; while the EU perceives it as a 'threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability'.95 In practice, this generates an excessive preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with their purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, this 'securitisation' of global crises does not render us safer. Instead, by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive action, it guarantees greater insecurity. Thus, a recent US Department of Defense report explores the future of international conflict up to 2050. It warns of 'resource competition induced by growing populations and expanding economies', particularly due to a projected 'youth bulge' in the South, which 'will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water and energy'. This will prompt a 'return to traditional security threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting natural resources and overseas markets'. Finally, climate change will 'compound' these stressors by generating humanitarian crises, population migrations and other complex emergencies.96 A similar study by the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of ‘the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents’, the report concludes that ‘The implications for future conflict are ominous.’97 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: ‘In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s’, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. ‘Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.’98 The assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conflict due to their rapidly growing populations. A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable ‘youth bulge’ by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to ‘endemic unemployment’ will be channelled through ‘political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces’. More strangely, predicting an intensifying global divide between a super-rich elite, the middle classes and an urban under-class, the report warns: ‘The world’s middle classes might unite, using access to knowledge, resources and skills to shape transnational processes in their own class interest.’99 Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrate how secur-itisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarization against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In other words, the internal reductionism, fragmentation and compartmentalisation that plagues orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these characteristics by externalising global crises from one another, externalising states from one another, externalising the inter-state system from its biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous 'outsiders\*. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the construction of new "outsider\* identities is insufficient to understand the causal dynamics driving the process of 'Otherisation'. As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against international terrorism reveals an underlying 'discursive complex", where representations about terrorism and non-Western populations are premised on 'the construction of stark boundaries\* that 'operate to exclude and include\*. Yet these exclusionary discourses are 'intimately bound up with political and economic processes', such as strategic interests in proliferating military bases in the Middle East, economic interests in control of oil, and the wider political goal of 'maintaining American hegemony\* by dominating a resource-rich region critical for global capitalism.100 But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic discourses is mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests — exclusionary discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a preeminence in bureaucratic military-political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different. As Hinton observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of 'othering\* in which an imagined community becomes reshaped so that previously 'included\* groups become 'ideologically recast' and dehumanised as threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or economic lines — eventually legitimising their annihilation.102 In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and 'Otherised' in accordance with a specific socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of 'inclusion\*, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.1 3 This recalls Lemkin's recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider socio-political project - or colonial project — designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable. Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated sociopolitical crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new 'outsider' group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually culminate in actual genocide, can become legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises.105 This does not imply that the securitisation of global crises by Western defence agencies is genocidal. Rather, the same essential dynamics of social polarisation and exclusionary group identity formation evident in genocides are highly relevant in understanding the radicalisation processes behind mass violence. This highlights the fundamental connection between social crisis, the breakdown of prevailing norms, the formation of new exclusionary group identities, and the projection of blame for crisis onto a newly constructed 'outsider' group vindicating various forms of violence.

#### The alt is to interrogate the epistemological failures of the 1ac --- this is a prerequisite to successful policy.

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While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a 'human security' approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to 'non-traditional' security issues.106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of 'surface' impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conflict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these 'surface' impacts - which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad. The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies - as a discourse - is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies (which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures). This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost - precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question. As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conflict per se. Neither 'resource shortages' nor 'resource abundance' (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) necessitate conflict by themselves. There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict. The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them. Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy 'reform' is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation. Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse 'Others', newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously amplified by global crises - a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences - drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences - is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.

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#### The United States federal government should amend Title 22 of US Code (22 U.S.C. 6065) so that a transition government in Cuba is defined as a government that is taking appropriate steps to restitute and/or compensate United States citizens for property taken by the Cuban government, as outlined in the following addendum. The United States federal government should offer to negotiate a Bilateral Investment Treaty with Cuba that includes a Step-Down Restitution Policy.

#### We’ll insert this description of the counterplan.

#### Current language

Title 22-FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE CHAPTER 69A-CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY (LIBERTAD) SUBCHAPTER II-ASSISTANCE TO FREE AND INDEPENDENT CUBA

§6065. Requirements and factors for determining transition government

(a) Requirements

For the purposes of this chapter, a transition government in Cuba is a government that-

(1) has legalized all political activity;

(2) has released all political prisoners and allowed for investigations of Cuban prisons by appropriate international human rights organizations;

(3) has dissolved the present Department of State Security in the Cuban Ministry of the Interior, including the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and the Rapid Response Brigades; and

(4) has made public commitments to organizing free and fair elections for a new government-

(A) to be held in a timely manner within a period not to exceed 18 months after the transition government assumes power;

(B) with the participation of multiple independent political parties that have full access to the media on an equal basis, including (in the case of radio, television, or other telecommunications media) in terms of allotments of time for such access and the times of day such allotments are given; and

(C) to be conducted under the supervision of internationally recognized observers, such as the Organization of American States, the United Nations, and other election monitors;

(5) has ceased any interference with Radio Marti or Television Marti broadcasts;

(6) makes public commitments to and is making demonstrable progress in-

(A) establishing an independent judiciary;

(B) respecting internationally recognized human rights and basic freedoms as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which Cuba is a signatory nation;

(C) allowing the establishment of independent trade unions as set forth in conventions 87 and 98 of the International Labor Organization, and allowing the establishment of independent social, economic, and political associations;

(7) does not include Fidel Castro or Raul Castro; and

(8) has given adequate assurances that it will allow the speedy and efficient distribution of assistance to the Cuban people.

(b) Additional factors

In addition to the requirements in subsection (a) of this section, in determining whether a transition government in Cuba is in power, the President shall take into account the extent to which that government-

(1) is demonstrably in transition from a communist totalitarian dictatorship to representative democracy;

(2) has made public commitments to, and is making demonstrable progress in-

(A) effectively guaranteeing the rights of free speech and freedom of the press, including granting permits to privately owned media and telecommunications companies to operate in Cuba;

(B) permitting the reinstatement of citizenship to Cuban-born persons returning to Cuba;

(C) assuring the right to private property; and

(D) taking appropriate steps to return to United States citizens (and entities which are 50 percent or more beneficially owned by United States citizens) property taken by the Cuban Government from such citizens and entities on or after January 1, 1959, or to provide equitable compensation to such citizens and entities for such property;

(3) has extradited or otherwise rendered to the United States all persons sought by the United States Department of Justice for crimes committed in the United States; and

(4) has permitted the deployment throughout Cuba of independent and unfettered international human rights monitors.

(Pub. L. 104–114, title II, §205, Mar. 12, 1996, 110 Stat. 811.)

#### Language post-counterplan

Title 22-FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE CHAPTER 69A-CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY (LIBERTAD) SUBCHAPTER II-ASSISTANCE TO FREE AND INDEPENDENT CUBA

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~~(Pub. L. 104–114, title II, §205, Mar. 12, 1996, 110 Stat. 811.)~~

#### Setting up a Bilateral Investment Treaty as a mechanism for compensation helps Cuba meet the only condition that is keeping the embargo in place

**Mowry, ’99** (David, Senior Counsel Xerox Corporation “Lifting the Embargo against Cuba Using Vietnam as a Model: A Policy Paper for Modernity” Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 25 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 229, lexis)

The obstacles that prevent a President from lifting the embargo against Cuba arbitrarily would appear to be no more than a facade of legislation. n210 If the President determines that it is prudent for the United States to once again open trade relations with Cuba, then the President may, after the appropriate reports to Congress, lift the embargo. n211 Of course the American Congress has the power to override a Presidential decree by a two-thirds majority, and it seems that no President would take such a politically volatile step without extensive consultation with, and acquiescence of, Congressional leadership. n212 Given the normalization of relations with the Communist leadership of Vietnam, America's reasons for imposing the embargo against Cuba can no longer be said to hinge on the Communist ideology of Cuba's leadership. Rather, [\*259] the final issue yet to be resolved, or discussed by the United States and Cuba, surrounds the property claims resulting from the expropriation of property during the Castro revolution. As the statutory authority, specifically LIBERTAD, suggests, the settlement of claims for property seized during the beginning of Castro's rise to power are as yet unsettled. n213 International law is made up of international custom and international agreement. n214 Only states consenting to such agreements are bound by the agreements. n215 Accepted practices among states, as well as international tribunal decisions, can give rise to international custom. n216 International law requires a state to pay full compensation for "takings" of foreign owned property. n217 The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States provides that a taking that is discriminatory, not for a public purpose, and not accompanied by "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation is unlawful. n218 The United States maintains that the property seized by Cuba was part of an expropriation program that discriminated against U.S. nationals, was not for a public purpose, and compensation that was to have been prompt, adequate, and effective, has never been paid. n219 Though there are arguments from developing nations that "full" compensation should be a relative term so as not to upset a developing economy, [\*260] international tribunals have held that full compensation is the standard under international law. n220 The issue of settling the property claims against Cuba would seem to be as simple as Cuba signing an agreement with the United States, much as Vietnam did, promising to compensate the U.S. Government and its national claimants what it owes them. n221 For Vietnam, the amount was U.S. $ 208 million, in Cuba's case the amount is approximately U.S. $ 13 billion. n222 The amount of money owed by Cuba for the takings brings about a dilemma for the United States. Cuba, in its current economic state, would not be able to pay U.S. $ 13 billion; conversely, if the U.S. Government were to settle with Cuba for an amount less than that owed, the U.S. Government could be held liable to any of the over 5000 claimants to the taken property for the difference. n223 The potential liability of the U.S. Government may be the motivation that has kept the United States from negotiating a settlement with Cuba. As Cuba's economy has continued to grow, albeit at a slow pace, there appears to be little chance that the United States could negotiate a one-time payment from Cuba for what has continued to grow to well over U.S. $ 13 billion. However, utilizing a carefully planned business investment treaty, as well as a "road map" modeled on the tactics used with Vietnam, the United States could approach Cuba with a plan that would not only satisfy the claims for taken property and avoid American liability and litigation with the former property owners, but would sufficiently bolster the Cuban economy so that full compensation could be paid over time. The U.S. statutes currently in place do not require full [\*261] compensation for taken property before the embargo against Cuba may be lifted. n224 Phase one of the "road map" with Cuba, therefore, would consist of the United States approaching Cuba with a draft BIT, n225 as well as indications that the embargo will be lifted if certain steps are followed: Cuba will have to facilitate a change in policy towards the United States and indicate a willingness, by signing the BIT, to begin compensation for the taken property, as well as a willingness to consider multiparty elections. Phase two of the "road map" would consist of the partial lifting of the embargo against Cuba by having the United States alleviate travel restrictions, and open telecommunications lines and services with Cuba. This would begin to fuel the Cuban tourism economy, and would allow Cuba to begin updating its obsolete communications technology systems. n226 Conversely, Cuba would begin payments into a central compensation fund of a set amount per year, to be determined by the two governments. These payments would be compensation for any properties that Cuba is unwilling, or unable to restore, to the former owners. Cuba would also have to hold free elections with at least one other viable political party other than the Communist party. Phase three, the final phase, would consist of the transition of Cuba's Government from a one party oligarchy to a freely elected ruling body. The United States would then lift all trade restrictions against Cuba, as per the BIT. The influx of trade from the United States would strengthen Cuba's economy sufficiently so that the graduated repayments to former owners of property in Cuba would compensate them for their losses, and the U.S. Government would not be liable for any losses. [\*262]

#### Step-Down Restitution Policy is the best mechanism --- flexibility in payment ensures appropriate and quick redress and means Cuba says yes

**Espino, ‘8** (Daniel- JD Candidate Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, President and Chairman of the Board of Puente de Jovenes Profesionales Cubanos and President of the Hispanic Law Students Association, Spring, “Step-Down Restitution: A Proposal For An Equitable Resolution To Confiscated Cuban Property” Nova Law Review, 32 Nova L. Rev. 423, lexis)

[\*451] V. IMPLEMENTATION The Step-Down Restitution Policy should be implemented by way of a special tribunal or court established by agreement between the United States and Cuba. Such an agreement must include a provision in which both countries commit "to act in good faith so as to promote the mutual prosperity of their nations and citizens." n188 A post-Castro Cuban government must pledge to create a special court to resolve all confiscated property claims "by Cuban nationals who became nationals of the United States after the date of accrual of such claims." n189 This court will have independent and limited jurisdiction within the Cuban judicial system. n190 In implementing the Step-Down Restitution Policy, a future Cuban property claims court can turn to the lessons learned in Iran and Ethiopia, where similar courts were introduced to handle confiscated property claims. n191 A. Lessons from Iran In 1982, Iran and the United States established a dedicated tribunal for the redress of property claims akin to the one needed in Cuba to implement the Step-Down Restitution Policy. n192 The need for a claims tribunal in the case of Iran was prompted by the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Forces acting in support of the Ayatollah seized not only the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, but also many privately held American assets. Correspondingly, the necessity of claims tribunals in the case of Cuba was prompted by Castro's revolution in 1959, and the still-uncompensated property seizures that went along with it. The two situations thus present similarities in terms of the emotional and political aspects of the breakdown in relations. n193 Like the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, a future Cuban property claims court implementing the Step-Down Restitution Policy will have to apply law and policy in a flexible manner, granting jurisdiction over a series of claims that arise in differing circumstances, taking law and policy from various sources including Cuban and international law, and granting different redress [\*452] depending on the circumstances. n194 However, in issuing remedies, a future Cuban property claims court should do well to consider that Cuba, unlike Iran, has low-valued currency and limited or no funds with which to pay compensation claims--claims that may include payment of the value of property, interest, lost profits, and/or past unpaid rent. n195 As such, the preferred remedy of direct restitution should be granted where possible. An important lesson Cuba can learn from Iran is that "much can be done with informal structures and the good will of [the] participants." n196 Because the Step-Down Restitution Policy does not provide for the expulsion of tenants and businesses on confiscated properties, informal mediations could facilitate the settlement of property claims where the true owner simply seeks reinstitution of title and would be content with collecting rent from tenants on the property. Given the proximity of Cuba to the United States and the sizeable Cuban/Cuban American population residing in the United States, relations with Cuba and the establishment of a Cuban property claims court will not likely suffer the delays and set-backs faced in Iran given the limited cultural boundaries and understood motivations amongst the groups with interests in Cuba. n197 B. Lessons from Ethiopia The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission is another example of a property claims tribunal created by bilateral treaty. n198 While the Ethiopian Commission was given broad jurisdiction--even so far as to include tort claims--in a post war scenario, a future Cuban property claims court implementing the Step-Down Restitution Policy may nevertheless find applicable case law stemming from the Ethiopian court because of their stance on confiscated property. n199 The Ethiopian Commission stated: A belligerent is bound to ensure insofar as possible that the property of protected persons is not despoiled or wasted. If private property of enemy nationals is to be frozen or otherwise impaired in wartime, it must be done by the State, and under conditions [\*453] providing for the property's protection and its eventual disposition by return to the owners or through post-war agreement. n200 Such a proclamation is at the heart of the Step-Down Restitution Policy and should be at the heart of any remediation treaty, program, or policy implemented by Cuba. VI. CONCLUSION Cuba will eventually take its first step towards the long road to a free market society. In this endeavor, Cuba should implement the Step-Down Restitution Policy as a means of achieving a prompt and efficient resolution to hundreds of thousands of property claims. The presumptive remedy of restitution will allow many Cuban exiles to take up their property and begin to make improvements to it immediately with the resources they have amassed while living elsewhere, mainly the United States. While situations may arise where former property owners find occupants currently living on the expropriated property, the Cuban government should take measures to prevent conflict between the parties and the eviction of these individuals. Given the poor housing sector, Cuba will likely have to implement legislation calling for the construction of affordable housing for Cuban Nationals living on the island currently oc-cupying confiscated property, who do not have their own confiscated property to which to return. Restitution is most appropriate for commercial properties which have undergone little or no change during the Castro regime. Given its proximity to the United States, Cuba will surely attract an enormous number of tourists from the United States and will most likely become a "stop" on the itineraries of many vacation cruise lines, like Puerto Rico and the Bahamas. With the potential for sudden interest in the country, Cuba will need to provide fast and efficient remedies to corporate claimants. With the award of direct restitution, corporate claimants may immediately use their property or alienate their property to corporations who have the resources and are ready to invest in industries such as tourism and mining. The greatest strength of restitution is the symbolism of the act. Restitution represents returning Cuba to its pre-Communist days of individual success and economic prosperity. The greatest strength of the Step-Down Restitution Policy, however, is the flexibility afforded to the fledgling democratic Cuban Government in its ability to award appropriate remedies on a case-by-case basis. With the adoption of such a policy, a healthy body of case law will quickly be established and allow for the dispensation of property claims based on differing scenarios. Although Cuba has limited land resources to offer in the form of substituted restitution, varying forms of compensation coupled with restitution or alternative remedies will allow Cuba to adequately, efficiently, and equitably handle confiscated property claims. The different types of claimants which will approach Cuba seeking restitution and the various forms of property expropriated during the Castro regime should force Cuba to avoid applying a one-size-fits-all resolution to confiscated property claims. Such a sweeping method aimed to settle all claims quickly will infuriate those on the short end of the remediation arrangement. The Step-Down Restitution Policy, with its varying remedies, allows for former owners to seek justice for Cuba's transgressions by allowing them to receive individualistic and equitable remediation.

#### The current embargo holds Cuba responsible for compensation for property taken during the Castro revolution – lifting the embargo and normalizing relations makes the US legally responsible for that compensation under the Takings Clause – that causes lawsuits against the federal government that collapses relations

**Smagula**, Associate with Totti, Rodriguez Diaz & Fuentes, **’95** (John, Fall, “Redirecting Focus: Justifying the U.S. Embargo Against Cuba and Resolving the Stalemate” North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation, 21 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 66, lexis)

B. Full Compensation as an Inflexible Standard In extreme cases, full compensation may not be necessary. n227 The Restatement (Third) also notes that full compensation is required "in the absence of exceptional circumstances." n228 Comment d of the Restatement (Third) further discusses a very narrow range of "exceptional" circumstances, but exempts takings characteristic of those done by Cuba. n229 In INA Corp. v. Iran, n230 Judge Lagergren endorsed, in prin- [\*91] ciple, a lower standard of compensation in "large-scale nationalizations," in which a country simply cannot afford to pay full compensation. n231 In recent decisions, however, no arbitrator has argued that the amount of an award should be reduced due to economic effects on the expropriating state. n232 In the same arbitral decision, Judge Holtzmann soundly refuted Judge Lagergren's statement that in cases of "large scale" nationalizations full compensation need not be paid. n233 The International Court of Justice has described such partial compensation settlements as being sui generis and as such, they are no guide under international law. n234 Moreover, a country that claims it may pay partial compensation to those it has financially injured also violates the international legal principle of nemo judex in re sua. n235 Professor Wortley states: [A] State may exercise the liberty to accept less than is due to it or its nationals, should it so decide. In order to further peaceful relations, States have often done that. But the exercise of liberty by the creditor State is a different matter from saying that the debtor has a right to fix the terms of which he will be free from liability, especially when the seizure takes place in circumstances which themselves constitute an illegality. n236 C. U.S. Government Responsibility to the Property Owners The U.S. Executive Branch may, within limits that are not fully clear, settle the claims of its citizens against a foreign country. n237 If the [\*92] President were to enter into a partial compensation agreement, the U.S. government may then become liable to its citizens because of the Fifth Amendment protection of property interests. The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not "be taken for public use, without just compensation." n238 In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, n239 the Supreme Court referred to the "self-executing" character of the Fifth Amendment provision requiring compensation when a governmental taking of property has occurred. n240 In its discussion of the obligations imposed upon government by the Fifth Amendment, the Court held that this provision does not "prohibit the taking of property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power." n241 The Court reasoned: This basic understanding of the [Fifth] Amendment makes clear that it is designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking. Thus, government action that works a taking of property rights necessarily implicated the "constitutional obligation" to pay just compensation. n242 If the United States were to settle the claims of its citizens against Cuba, those claimants would be left with no existing property interests with respect to that nation. Any uncompensated portions of their claims would be canceled against Cuba and thus rendered valueless. Armstrong v. United States n243 provides a similar fact pattern, in which the federal government terminated a shipbuilding contract, thereby acquiring all the materials purchased by the shipbuilder to perform the contract. n244 The suppliers to the shipbuilder were, upon the govern- [\*93] ment's action, left with unenforceable liens against those materials because of the federal government's sovereign immunity. n245 The Supreme Court held that the government's action constituted a "taking" of the liens because the value of the liens was destroyed. n246 The Armstrong rule can be applied in an international context to a partial compensation agreement between Cuba and the United States. The court in Dames & Moore v. Regan upheld the President's action in dismissing pending litigation by U.S. companies against Iran for, among other things, property expropriations in that country, stating "though we conclude that the President has settled petitioner's claims against Iran, we do not suggest that the settlement has terminated petitioner's possible taking claim against the United States." n247 Justice Powell, concurring in part and dissenting in part, stated "the Government must pay just compensation when it furthers the Nation's foreign policy goals by using as "bargaining chips' claims lawfully held by a relatively few persons and subject to the jurisdiction of our courts." n248 In Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, n249 the Claims Court found that the U.S. government's settlement of a U.S. citizen's claim against the People's Republic of China for partial value did not give rise to a Fifth Amendment obligation to compensate the claimant for its uncompensated losses. n250 However, within a year of the decision in Shanghai Power, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Langenegger v. United States n251 held that The Claims Court [in Langenegger] below incorrectly held that appellants' claim was nonjustifiable and that the extinguishment of a claim under international law cannot amount to a taking; the court relied on Shanghai Power Co. v. United States ... We note that the lower court's Shanghai Power decision does not present an absolute rule that the extinguishment of a claim under international law can never amount to a taking. n252 The Langenegger case reinforced well-settled law that requires each takings issue be resolved on a case-by-case basis. n253 Several factual diff- [\*94] erences existed between the settlement with the People's Republic of China and a potential settlement with Cuba in the post-Cold War era. n254 A major distinction is Cuba's willingness to allow foreign private investors to participate in its economy. n255 Such a willingness readily distinguishes China at the time of the Shanghai Power decision from Cuba, since property rights and private investment go hand in hand. n256 The Supreme Court has recently affirmed the constitutional commitment to property rights. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in Dolan v. City of Tigard n257 that "we see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor relation." n258 The Environmental Protection Agency must comply with similar restraints mandating that the EPA provide full compensation for its takings and for its declaring private property unusable for various environmental purposes. n259 If the United States were to settle its citizens' claims against Cuba for less than their full value, the U.S. government could be held liable for the difference. In the current environment of budget cutting and deficit reduction, it is unlikely that the U.S. government would subject itself to such liability. Thus, the United States would be unwise to encourage such a settlement because the potentially enormous liability of the U.S. government would invariably cast a cloud over any progress in U.S.-Cuban relations.

#### New Takings Clause litigation results in massive new spending that busts the budget

**Tsongas**, former Senator, 6-12-**95**(Paul, “Environmental Regulations & Property Rights,” before the Senate Committee on Environment Works, FDCH Congressional Testimony)

Thank you Mr. Chairman for the invitation to testify today. It is a privi-lege to be among my former colleagues in the Senate and to have the opportunity to share with you my serious concerns about proposed takings legislation. The takings bill passed by the House of Representatives (H.R.925), and the even more sweeping takings bill introduced in the Senate (S.605), represent bad fiscal policy. I urge the members of the Senate to reject these misguided and destructive proposals. I believe the mounting Federal deficit is one OF the greatest threats to our national welfare and to our children's future. I am the co-founder of the Con-cord Coalition, an organization dedicated to reducing the Federal deficit and to bringing the Federal Budget into balance by the year 2002. I campaigned for the presidency of the United States because of my concern that the political debate in this country too often overlooks our national fiscal crisis and other long- term issues that will determine this country's future. From the standpoint of a citizen dedicated to improving our nation's fiscal discipline, takings legislation is a prescription for disaster. Taking bills are budget busters. They would invite an avalanche of new claims for financial compensation against the Federal government. The "takings" clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees "just compensation" in the event of an actual taking of private property. But these bills would require the public to pay out billions of dollars when there has been no actual taking and no "just compensation" is due under the Constitution. They would require unjust compensation at taxpayer expense. The implementation of these bills also would be costly because they would require many new government attorneys to handle the new claims and many other new employees to administer the regulations flowing from this legislation. There have been various efforts to put a precise figure on the cost of tak-ings legislation. The Office of Management and Budget has estimated that the House-passed takings bill would cost the taxpayers $28 billion over the next seven years. OMB has also stated that S.605, which is broader in scope than H.R.925, would be several fold more expensive than the House bill. I understand that the Congressional Budget Office in the 103rd Congress published an estimate that takings legislation in the wetlands context alone could cost as much as $45 billion. It is clear from these varying estimates that no one can predict all of the costs of these bills with any real accuracy. This uncertainty should itself be a cause for concern about the impact of takings on the deficit. The bottom line is that takings legislation would put massive new pressure on the Federal budget when our energy should instead be concentrated on bringing revenues and expenses into balance.

#### Court clog from new litigation independently destroys the economy

**Fix-Fierro**, Circuit Master Judge, **3** (Hector, Courts, Justice, & Efficiency: A Social Justice Legal Study of Economic Rationality in Adjudication, p. 123)

Regarding the second question, ie, competition between legal systems121 and the role of courts in such a process, legal rules obviously serve as an important instrument for attracting foreign trade and investment by creating comparative economic advantages. After all, this is the logic that lies behind the impressive transformation that the legal systems of many countries experienced in the 1980s and 1990s towards economic and political liberalisation, with considerable success.122 In this context, and as has already been stated, domestic courts play an important role as a factor in the general climate of economic and political stability, as well as of legal certainty, that favors investment, trade and, ultimately, growth. In fact, the perception that domestic courts are ineffective and inefficient, or that their judgments and interpretations may reduce economic opportunities, will weigh heavily on the decision-making process of foreign {and domestic) economic actors.123

#### Collapses power projection – leads to nuclear war

**Harris and Burrows 9**

Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer is a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>

Increased Potential for Global Conflict

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.

### 1nc

#### Next off is the Iran disad.

#### OFAC is overstretched --- the plan makes sanctions effective

**Johnson, Spector and Lilac 10** - Andy Johnson, Director, National Security Program, Kyle Spector, Policy Advisor, National Security Program, Kristina Lilac, National Security Program, Senior Fellows of The Third Way Institute, (“End the Embargo of Cuba”, Article for The Third Way Institute, 9/16/10, <http://content.thirdway.org/publications/326/Third_Way_Memo_-_End_the_Embargo_of_Cuba.pdf>, Accessed 7/02/13, AW)

Keeping the embargo in place requires that the US government devote time and resources to fighting a Cold War -8 era threat. Senator Chris Dodd argued in a 2005 op ed that the US spends “extraordinary resources” each year to enforce the sanctions instead of devoting such resources to the fight against terrorism. 4 While the financial resources dedicated to enforcing the embargo may be limited compared to resources dedicated to other causes, lifting the Cuban embargo could put the US in a better position to fight terrorist organizations by freeing up resources currently enforcing the embargo. For example, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which governs travel and trade between the US and Cuba, is also responsible for maintaining sanctions against truly problematic countries, including Iran and North Korea. OFAC also is responsible for responding to economic threats posed by terrorist organizations and narcotics traffickers. By ending OFAC’s need to regulate the Cuban embargo, OFAC could instead devote those resources to respond to the current threats posed by rogue states and terrorist networks

**That revamps sanctions on Iran.**

**Maberry and Jensen 13** – J. Scott Maberry, J.D, Georgetown University Law Center, International Trade partner in the Government Contracts, Investigations & International Trade Practice Group, Mark L. Jensen, J.D, Harvard Law School, International Trade associate in the Government Contracts, Investigations & International Trade Practice Group, (“OFAC gets hot, bothered on Iran and Cuba: how economic sanctions work today”, Report for Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, 5/7/13, <http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8657e6ce-454a-4eaf-ba8b-d225ea59ecdd>, Accessed 7/9/13, AW)

People who practice U.S. economic sanctions law like to talk about how sanctions are policy-oriented, or an engine of U.S. foreign policy. Whereas some laws may be more opaquely political, economic sanctions and embargoes seem to express most bluntly how international leverage works through regulation. And yet, a few recent regulatory developments show that the direction that sanctions take is not always predictable. The U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) has had a raucously busy year. A torrent of development in laws and regulations on Iran served as the unsurprising focus of this year’s OFAC symposium, held on March 19, 2013, in Washington D.C. Among the developments were sanctions imposed on non-U.S. banks, a new executive order related to the purchase of petroleum and petrochemical products from Iran, an expanded scope of the Iran Transactions and Sanctions Regulations to companies “owned or controlled” by U.S. companies, and a new statute that targets sectors of the economy related to goods and services to Iran, including secondary financial transactions in energy, shipping, shipbuilding, precious metal, and graphite. See our recent posts on Iran here and here. Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Iran sanctions program is its proliferation into not only additional laws and regulations, but also additional regulatory regimes. The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (“CISADA”), the National Defense Authorization Act for 2012 (“NDAA”), and Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (“ITR”), have created a polyglot system focused on individual sectors of the economy. OFAC presenters at the March symposium gave the sense of a proliferation of laws that is undoubtedly aimed at accomplishing U.S. foreign policy goals. But the laws are paradoxically both targeted (at industries, vessels, banks) and incredibly expansive in jurisdiction. The system is the embodiment of the powerful yet somewhat disorganized U.S. government piling on everything it can to economically overwhelm Iran. The Iran program also serves as a good case study of how far and wide economic sanctions can be made to reach. If legislation of past years has proved anything, it is that the U.S. Congress appears ready to use any and all means within its legislative authority to sanction Iran. Insofar as Congress is able to map out the reach of the U.S. financial system and economy further, it seems likely that additional sanctions will be applied.

#### Diplomatic resolution to Iran prolif now --- sanctions undermine diplomacy --- causes US-Iran war and broader Middle East war.

**Shank and Gould 9/12**

Michael Shank, Ph.D., is director of foreign policy at the Friends Committee on National Legislation. Kate Gould is legislative associate for Middle East policy at FCNL, No Iran deal, but significant progress in Geneva, 9/12/13, http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/cause-conflict-conclusion/2013/nov/12/no-iran-deal-significant-progress-geneva/

Congress should welcome, not stubbornly dismiss, diplomatic efforts to finalize the interim accord and support the continued conversation to reach a more comprehensive agreement. The sanctions that hawks on the Hill are pushing derail such efforts and increase the prospects of war. ¶ There is, thankfully, a growing bipartisan contingent of Congress who recognizes that more sanctions could undercut the delicate diplomatic efforts underway. Senator Carl Levin, D-Mich., chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, cautioned early on that, “We should not at this time impose additional sanctions.” ¶ Senator Tim Johnson, D-S.D., chair of the Banking Committee, is still weighing whether to press forward with new sanctions in his committee. Separately, as early as next week, the Senate could vote on Iran sanctions amendments during the chamber’s debate on the must-pass annual defense authorization bill.¶ This caution against new sanctions, coming from these more sober quarters of the Senate, echoes the warnings from a wide spectrum of former U.S. military officials against new sanctions. There is broad recognition by U.S. and Israeli security officials that the military option is not the preferred option; a diplomatic one is. ¶ This widespread support for a negotiated solution was highlighted last week when 79 national security heavyweights signed on to a resounding endorsement of the Obama Administration’s latest diplomatic efforts.¶ Any member of Congress rejecting a diplomatic solution moves the United States toward another war in the Middle East. Saying no to this deal-in-the-works, furthermore, brings the world no closer toward the goal of Iran giving up its entire nuclear program. Rather, it would likely result in an unchecked Iranian enrichment program, while the United States and Iran would teeter perilously close on the brink of war. ¶ A deal to prevent war and a nuclear-armed Iran is within reach and it would be dangerous to let it slip away. Congress can do the right thing here, for America’s security and Middle East’s stability, and take the higher diplomatic road. Pandering to harsh rhetoric and campaign contributors is no way to sustain a foreign policy agenda. It will only make America and her assets abroad less secure, not more. The time is now to curb Iran’s enrichment program as well as Congress’s obstructionism to a peaceful path forward.

#### Global nuke war.

**Avery 11/6**

John Scales, Lektor Emeritus, Associate Professor, at the Department of Chemistry, University of Copenhagen, since 1990 he has been the Contact Person in Denmark for Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, An Attack On Iran Could Escalate Into Global Nuclear War, 11/6/13, http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm

Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all reasonable concessions to US demands, Israeli pressure groups in Washington continue to demand an attack on Iran. But such an attack might escalate into a global nuclear war, with catastrophic consequences.¶ As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we should remember that this colossal disaster escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict. There is a danger that an attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the Middle East, entirely destabilizing a region that is already deep in problems.¶ The unstable government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict. Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into a general war in the Middle East. Since much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would certainly cause the price of oil to reach unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects on the global economy.¶ In the dangerous situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that nuclear weapons would be used, either intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent research has shown that besides making large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive contamination, a nuclear war would damage global agriculture to such a extent that a global famine of previously unknown proportions would result.¶ Thus, nuclear war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and much of the biosphere. To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the peoples of the world, US citizens included.

### multilat

#### Multilateralism unsustainable and it can’t solve anything

**Held et al, 13** – Master of University College and Professor of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Durham, and Director of Polity Press and General Editor of Global Policy (David, “Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation,” ProQuest, 5/24/2013, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1355105016) // MS

\*\*\*Edited for ablest language

Economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. The Doha round of trade negotiations is deadlocked, despite eight successful multilateral trade rounds before it. Climate negotiators have met for two decades without finding a way to stem global emissions. The UN is ~~paralyzed~~ in the face of growing insecurities across the world, the latest dramatic example being Syria. Each of these phenomena could be treated as if it was independent, and an explanation sought for the peculiarities of its causes. Yet, such a perspective would fail to show what they, along with numerous other instances of breakdown in international negotiations, have in common. Global cooperation is gridlocked across a range of issue areas. The reasons for this are not the result of any single underlying causal structure, but rather of several underlying dynamics that work together. Global cooperation today is failing not simply because it is very difficult to solve many global problems - indeed it is - but because previous phases of global cooperation have been incredibly successful, producing unintended consequences that have overwhelmed the problem-solving capacities of the very institutions that created them. It is hard to see how this situation can be unravelled, given failures of contemporary global leadership, the weaknesses of NGOs in converting popular campaigns into institutional change and reform, and the domestic political landscapes of the most powerful countries. A golden era of governed globalization In order to understand why gridlock has come about it is important to understand how it was that the post-Second World War era facilitated, in many respects, a successful form of 'governed globalization' that contributed to relative peace and prosperity across the world over several decades. This period was marked by peace between the great powers, although there were many proxy wars fought out in the global South. This relative stability created the conditions for what now can be regarded as an unprecedented period of prosperity that characterized the 1950s onward. Although it is by no means the sole cause, the UN is central to this story, helping to create conditions under which decolonization and successive waves of democratization could take root, profoundly altering world politics. While the economic record of the postwar years varies by country, many experienced significant economic growth and living standards rose rapidly across significant parts of the world. By the late 1980s a variety of East Asian countries were beginning to grow at an unprecedented speed, and by the late 1990s countries such as China, India and Brazil had gained significant economic momentum, a process that continues to this day. Meanwhile, the institutionalization of international cooperation proceeded at an equally impressive pace. In 1909, 37 intergovernmental organizations existed; in 2011, the number of institutions and their various off-shoots had grown to 7608 (Union of International Associations 2011). There was substantial growth in the number of international treaties in force, as well as the number of international regimes, formal and informal. At the same time, new kinds of. Postwar institutions created the conditions under which a multitude of actors could benefit from forming multinational companies, investing abroad, developing global production chains, and engaging with a plethora of other social and economic processes associated with globalization. These conditions, combined with the expansionary logic of capitalism and basic technological innovation, changed the nature of the world economy, radically increasing dependence on people and countries from every corner of the world. This interdependence, in turn, created demand for further institutionalization, which states seeking the benefits of cooperation provided, beginning the cycle anew. This is not to say that international institutions were the only cause of the dynamic form of globalization experienced over the last few decades. Changes in the nature of global capitalism, including breakthroughs in transportation and information technology, are obviously critical drivers of interdependence. However, all of these changes were allowed to thrive and develop because they took place in a relatively open, peaceful, liberal, institutionalized world order. By preventing World War Three and another Great Depression, the multilateral order arguably did just as much for interdependence as microprocessors or email (see Mueller 1990; O'Neal and Russett 1997). Beyond the special privileges of the great powers Self-reinforcing interdependence has now progressed to the point where it has altered our ability to engage in further global cooperation. That is, economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. Because of the remarkable success of global cooperation in the postwar order, human interconnectedness weighs much more heavily on politics than it did in 1945. The need for international cooperation has never been higher. Yet the "supply" side of the equation, institutionalized multilateral cooperation, has stalled. In areas such as nuclear proliferation, the explosion of small arms sales, terrorism, failed states, global economic imbalances, financial market instability, global poverty and inequality, biodiversity losses, water deficits and climate change, multilateral and transnational cooperation is now increasingly ineffective or threadbare. Gridlock is not unique to one issue domain, but appears to be becoming a general feature of global governance: cooperation seems to be increasingly difficult and deficient at precisely the time when it is needed most. It is possible to identify four reasons for this blockage, four pathways to gridlock: rising multipolarity, institutional inertia, harder problems, and institutional fragmentation. Each pathway can be thought of as a growing trend that embodies a specific mix of causal mechanisms. Each of these are explained briefly below. Growing multipolarity. The absolute number of states has increased by 300 percent in the last 70 years, meaning that the most basic transaction costs of global governance have grown. More importantly, the number of states that "matter" on a given issue--that is, the states without whose cooperation a global problem cannot be adequately addressed--has expanded by similar proportions. At Bretton Woods in 1945, the rules of the world economy could essentially be written by the United States with some consultation with the UK and other European allies. In the aftermath of the 2008-2009 crisis, the G-20 has become the principal forum for global economic management, not because the established powers desired to be more inclusive, but because they could not solve the problem on their own. However, a consequence of this progress is now that many more countries, representing a diverse range of interests, must agree in order for global cooperation to occur. Institutional inertia. The postwar order succeeded, in part, because it incentivized great power involvement in key institutions. From the UN Security Council, to the Bretton Woods institutions, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, key pillars of the global order explicitly grant special privileges to the countries that were wealthy and powerful at the time of their creation. This hierarchy was necessary to secure the participation of the most important countries in global governance. Today, the gain from this trade-off has shrunk while the costs have grown. As power shifts from West to East, North to South, a broader range of participation is needed on nearly all global issues if they are to be dealt with effectively. At the same time, following decolonization, the end of the Cold War and economic development, the idea that some countries should hold more rights and privileges than others is increasingly (and rightly) regarded as morally bankrupt. And yet, the architects of the postwar order did not, in most cases, design institutions that would organically adjust to fluctuations in national power. Harder problems. As independence has deepened, the types and scope of problems around which countries must cooperate has evolved. Problems are both now more extensive, implicating a broader range of countries and individuals within countries, and intensive, penetrating deep into the domestic policy space and daily life. Consider the example of trade. For much of the postwar era, trade negotiations focused on reducing tariff levels on manufactured products traded between industrialized countries. Now, however, negotiating a trade agreement requires also discussing a host of social, environmental, and cultural subjects - GMOs, intellectual property, health and environmental standards, biodiversity, labour standards--about which countries often disagree sharply. In the area of environmental change a similar set of considerations applies. To clean up industrial smog or address ozone depletion required fairly discrete actions from a small number of top polluters. By contrast, the threat of climate change and the efforts to mitigate it involve nearly all countries of the globe. Yet, the divergence of voice and interest within both the developed and developing worlds, along with the sheer complexity of the incentives needed to achieve a low carbon economy, have made a global deal, thus far, impossible (Falkner et al. 2011; Victor 2011). Fragmentation. The institution-builders of the 1940s began with, essentially, a blank slate. But efforts to cooperate internationally today occur in a dense institutional ecosystem shaped by path dependency. The exponential rise in both multilateral and transnational organizations has created a more complex multilevel and multi-actor system of global governance. Within this dense web of institutions mandates can conflict, interventions are frequently uncoordinated, and all too typically scarce resources are subject to intense competition. In this context, the proliferation of institutions tends to lead to dysfunctional fragmentation, reducing the ability of multilateral institutions to provide public goods. When funding and political will are scarce, countries need focal points to guide policy (Keohane and Martin 1995), which can help define the nature and form of cooperation. Yet, when international regimes overlap, these positive effects are weakened. Fragmented institutions, in turn, disaggregate resources and political will, while increasing transaction costs. In stressing four pathways to gridlock we emphasize the manner in which contemporary global governance problems build up on each other, although different pathways can carry more significance in some domains than in others. The challenges now faced by the multilateral order are substantially different from those faced by the 1945 victors in the postwar settlement. They are second-order cooperation problems arising from previous phases of success in global coordination. Together, they now block and inhibit problem solving and reform at the global level

#### Their Asia war impact ev says that US diplomacy is key --- US won’t exert effective diplomacy

Walt 3/4 -- American professor of international affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, previously taught at Princeton University and the University of Chicago (Stephen, 2013, "Is this any way to run U.S. foreign policy?" walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/04/is\_this\_any\_way\_to\_run\_us\_foreign\_policy)

Watching the musical chairs taking place in the first months of Obama's second term reminds me of how fundamentally unserious America's approach to foreign affairs really is. Kerry and Hagel are now in, but apparently Biden's star is ascending too, while all sorts of other folks are rotating to new jobs, unpacking their offices, or heading back to private life to pen memoirs. You might think this was a great opportunity for fresh thinking and renewed energy, but what it really reveals is how our approach to staffing foreign affairs may be the worst of all possible worlds. For starters, the United States has a relatively small civil service. Compared with other countries, a relatively large percentage of top government jobs are held by presidential appointees. The result: top jobs in the State Department and Pentagon are handled not by career foreign service officers or experienced bureaucrats, but by partisan appointees who rarely last more than a couple of years and then return to private life. Not only does this mean tremendous turnover whenever the White House changes hands, it means we are constantly bringing in people who lack experience or who are not up to speed on current issues. Next, the appointments process itself has gone completely off the rails. Candidates have to go through elaborate vetting procedures that would daunt a saint, and then they also face a Senate confirmation process that is slow, arbitrary, and leaves lots of positions unfilled for months if not years. And sometimes you get an embarrassing circus like the recent Hagel confirmation hearings, which revealed the GOP members of the Armed Services Committee to be spiteful and factually challenged hacks and no doubt confirmed many foreigners' dubious views of America's overall political competence. Third, we are so afraid that our career diplomats will "go native" or develop "localitis," that we discourage them from developing deep regional expertise and instead rotate them around the globe on a frequent basis. There is something to be said for gaining a global perspective, of course, but it also means that unlike some of our rivals, we won't have many diplomats with deep linguistic expertise or lots of in-depth experience in the societies in which they are operating. Yet we then expect them to hold their own against their local counterparts, or against diplomats from other countries whose knowledge and training in particular areas is more extensive. To make matters worse, the United States has a four-year presidential term and a campaign cycle that lasts well over a year. This latter period is far longer than the election periods in any other advanced democracy, and the endless parade of primaries and other forms of electoral hoopla eat up lots of bandwith in our national discourse. The result? The country, the incumbent administration, and the president's various rivals are all distracted for more than 25 percent of each president's term, and less able to make hard political choices. And then there's the question of resources. When there was a Cold War to win, American taxpayers were willing to devote one percent of GDP to non-military international affairs spending (e.g., on development, diplomacy, and things like that). Today, we spend about only 0.2 percent of GDP in this area, which tells you all you need to know about the real priority that Americans place on non-military tools of international influence. None of this would matter if the United States had a less ambitious foreign policy. But instead, we're trying to be the "indispensable power" on the cheap. The results, I am sorry to say, speak for themselves.

#### No risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant

**Mueller 10** (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html)

Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.

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#### Tons of other hotspots they don’t solve – their author

David **Bosco** **2006** (a senior editor at Foreign Policy magazine) July 2006 “Forum: Keeping an eye peeled for World War III” <http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06211/709477-109.stm_>

The understanding that small but violent acts can spark global conflagration is etched into the world's consciousness. The reverberations from Princip's shots in the summer of 1914 ultimately took the lives of more than 10 million people, shattered four empires and dragged more than two dozen countries into war. ¶ This hot summer, as the world watches the violence in the Middle East, the awareness of peace's fragility is particularly acute. The bloodshed in Lebanon appears to be part of a broader upsurge in unrest. Iraq is suffering through one of its bloodiest months since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. Taliban militants are burning schools and attacking villages in southern Afghanistan as the United States and NATO struggle to defend that country's fragile government. Nuclear-armed India is still cleaning up the wreckage from a large terrorist attack in which it suspects militants from rival Pakistan. The world is awash in weapons, North Korea and Iran are developing nuclear capabilities, and long-range missile technology is spreading like a virus. ¶ Some see the start of a global conflict. "We're in the early stages of what I would describe as the Third World War," former House Speaker Newt Gingrich said recently. Certain religious Web sites are abuzz with talk of Armageddon. There may be as much hyperbole as prophecy in the forecasts for world war. But it's not hard to conjure ways that today's hot spots could ignite. ¶ Consider the following scenarios: ¶ Targeting Iran: As Israeli troops seek out and destroy Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon, intelligence officials spot a shipment of longer-range Iranian missiles heading for Lebanon. The Israeli government decides to strike the convoy and Iranian nuclear facilities simultaneously. After Iran has recovered from the shock, Revolutionary Guards surging across the border into Iraq, bent on striking Israel's American allies. Governments in Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia face violent street protests demanding retribution against Israel -- and they eventually yield, triggering a major regional war. ¶ Missiles away: With the world's eyes on the Middle East, North Korea's Kim Jong Il decides to continue the fireworks show he began earlier this month. But this time his brinksmanship pushes events over the brink. A missile designed to fall into the sea near Japan goes astray and hits Tokyo, killing a dozen civilians. Incensed, the United States, Japan's treaty ally, bombs North Korean missile and nuclear sites. North Korean artillery batteries fire on Seoul, and South Korean and U.S. troops respond. Meanwhile, Chinese troops cross the border from the north to stem the flow of desperate refugees just as U.S. troops advance from the south. Suddenly, the world's superpower and the newest great power are nose to nose. ¶ Loose nukes: Al-Qaida has had Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in its sights for years, and the organization finally gets its man. Pakistan descends into chaos as militants roam the streets and the army struggles to restore order. India decides to exploit the vacuum and punish the Kashmir-based militants it blames for the recent Mumbai railway bombings. Meanwhile, U.S. special operations forces sent to secure Pakistani nuclear facilities face off against an angry mob. ¶ The empire strikes back: Pressure for democratic reform erupts in autocratic Belarus. As protesters mass outside the parliament in Minsk, president Alexander Lukashenko requests Russian support. After protesters are beaten and killed, they appeal for help, and neighboring Poland -- a NATO member with bitter memories of Soviet repression -- launches a humanitarian mission to shelter the regime's opponents. Polish and Russian troops clash, and a confrontation with NATO looms. ¶ As in the run-up to other wars, there is today more than enough tinder lying around to spark a great power conflict. The question is how effective the major powers have become at managing regional conflicts and preventing them from escalating. After two world wars and the decades-long Cold War, what has the world learned about managing conflict? ¶ The end of the Cold War had the salutary effect of dialing down many regional conflicts. In the 1960s and 1970s, every crisis in the Middle East had the potential to draw in the superpowers in defense of their respective client states. The rest of the world was also part of the Cold War chessboard. Compare the almost invisible U.N. peacekeeping mission in Congo today to the deeply controversial mission there in the early 1960s. (The Soviets were convinced that the U.N. mission was supporting a U.S. puppet, and Russian diplomats stormed out of several Security Council meetings in protest.) From Angola to Afghanistan, nearly every Cold War conflict was a proxy war. Now, many local crises can be handed off to the humanitarians or simply ignored.¶ But the end of the bipolar world has a downside. In the old days, the two competing superpowers sometimes reined in bellicose client states out of fear that regional conflicts would escalate. Which of the major powers today can claim to have such influence over Tehran or Pyongyang?¶ Today's world has one great advantage: None of the leading powers appears determined to reorder international affairs as Germany was before both world wars and as Japan was in the years before World War II.

#### No bioterrorism and no impact

**Mueller 10** [John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and a Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University, A.B. from the University of Chicago, M.A. and Ph.D. @ UCLA, Atomic Obsession – Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda, Oxford University Press]

Properly developed and deployed, biological weapons could potentially, if thus far only in theory, kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of people. The discussion remains theoretical because biological weapons have scarcely ever been used. For the most destructive results, they need to be dispersed in very low-altitude aerosol clouds. Since aerosols do not appreciably settle, pathogens like anthrax (which is not easy to spread or catch and is not contagious) would probably have to be sprayed near nose level. Moreover, 90 percent of the microorganisms are likely to die during the process of aerosolization, while their effectiveness could be reduced still further by sunlight, smog, humidity, and temperature changes. Explosive methods of dispersion may destroy the organisms, and, except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult: even if refrigerated, most of the organisms have a limited lifetime. Such weapons can take days or weeks to have full effect, during which time they can be countered with medical and civil defense measures. In the summary judgment of two careful analysts, delivering microbes and toxins over a wide area in the form most suitable for inflicting mass casualties-as an aerosol that could be inhaled-requires a delivery system of enormous sophistication, and even then effective dispersal could easily be disrupted by unfavorable environmental and meteorological conditions.

#### Alt cause - current Cuban economic model prohibits FDI

**Feinberg 11** - professor of international political economy at UC San Dieg, nonresident senior fellow with the Latin America Initiative at Brookings (Richard E., “Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the International Response”, November, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/18%20cuba%20feinberg/1118\_cuba\_feinberg.pdf)//ID

Despite these advances, the Cuban economy remains in the doldrums (as described in Section 1) . The main constraint slowing the Cuban economy is not U.S. sanctions (even as they have hit hard). Rather, it is Cuba’s own outdated economic model, inherited from the Soviet Union, of central planning . Cuba’s many commercial partners would like to invest more in Cuba and would prefer to purchase more Cuban exports to correct the imbalances in their bilateral trade accounts, but are frustrated by Cuba’s scant economic offerings.

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#### We control time frame and magnitude – deal failure draws in global powers and goes nuclear within months

**PressTV 11/13**

Global nuclear conflict between US, Russia, China likely if Iran talks fail, 11/13/13, http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/11/13/334544/global-nuclear-war-likely-if-iran-talks-fail/

A global conflict between the US, Russia, and China is likely in the coming months should the world powers fail to reach a nuclear deal with Iran, an American analyst says.¶ “If the talks fail, if the agreements being pursued are not successfully carried forward and implemented, then there would be enormous international pressure to drive towards a conflict with Iran before [US President Barack] Obama leaves office and that’s a very great danger that no one can underestimate the importance of,” senior editor at the Executive Intelligence Review Jeff Steinberg told Press TV on Wednesday. ¶ “The United States could find itself on one side and Russia and China on the other and those are the kinds of conditions that can lead to miscalculation and general roar,” Steinberg said. ¶ “So the danger in this situation is that if these talks don’t go forward, we could be facing a global conflict in the coming months and years and that’s got to be avoided at all costs when you’ve got countries like the United States, Russia, and China with” their arsenals of “nuclear weapons,” he warned. ¶ The warning came one day after the White House told Congress not to impose new sanctions against Tehran because failure in talks with Iran could lead to war.

**OFAC is unique – involves allied cooperation**

**DoT 05** – United States Department of Treasury, (“OFAC”, Report Written for the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, June 2005, <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Documents/ofac_sec_frb.pdf>, Accessed 7/9/13, AW)

OFAC administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on U.S. foreign policy and national security goals against targeted foreign countries, terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, and those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. OFAC acts under the President’s wartime and national emergency powers, as well as under authority granted by specific legislation, to impose controls on transactions and freeze assets under U.S. jurisdiction. Many of the sanctions are based on United Nations and other international mandates, are multilateral in scope, and involve close cooperation with allied governments. OFAC requirements are separate and distinct from the BSA, but both OFAC and the BSA share a common national security goal. For this reason, many financial institutions view compliance with OFAC sanctions as related to BSA compliance obligations; supervisory examination for BSA compliance is logically connected to the examination of a financial institution’s compliance with OFAC sanctions.

#### War would escalate – multiple reasons

**Kahl 12**

Colin, Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Not Time to Attack Iran, March/April 2012, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137031/colin-h-kahl/not-time-to-attack-iran?page=show

Kroenig's discussion of timing is not the only misleading part of his article; so is his contention that the United States could mitigate the "potentially devastating consequences" of a strike on Iran by carefully managing the escalation that would ensue. His picture of a clean, calibrated conflict is a mirage. Any war with Iran would be a messy and extraordinarily violent affair, with significant casualties and consequences.¶ According to Kroenig, Iran would not respond to a strike with its "worst forms of retaliation, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz or launching missiles at southern Europe" unless its leaders felt that the regime's "very existence was threatened." To mitigate this risk, he claims, the United States could "make clear that it is interested only in destroying Iran's nuclear program, not in overthrowing the government." But Iranian leaders have staked their domestic legitimacy on resisting inter-national pressure to halt the nuclear program, and so they would inevitably view an attack on that program as an attack on the regime itself. Decades of hostility and perceived U.S. efforts to undermine the regime would reinforce this perception. And when combined with the emphasis on anti-Americanism in the ideology of the supreme leader and his hard-line advisers, as well as their general ignorance about what drives U.S. decision-making, this perception means that there is little prospect that Iranian leaders would believe that a U.S. strike had limited aims. Assuming the worst about Washington's intentions, Tehran is likely to overreact to even a surgical strike against its nuclear facilities.¶ Kroenig nevertheless believes that the United States could limit the prospects for escalation by warning Iran that crossing certain "redlines" would trigger a devastating U.S. counterresponse. Ironically, Kroenig believes that a nuclear-armed Iran would be deeply irrational and prone to miscalculation yet somehow maintains that under the same leaders, Iran would make clear-eyed decisions in the immediate aftermath of a U.S. strike. But the two countries share no direct and reliable channels for communication, and the inevitable confusion brought on by a crisis would make signaling difficult and miscalculation likely.¶ To make matters worse, in the heat of battle, Iran would face powerful incentives to escalate. In the event of a conflict, both sides would come under significant pressure to stop the fighting due to the impact on international oil markets. Since this would limit the time the Iranians would have to reestablish deterrence, they might choose to launch a quick, all-out response, without care for redlines. Iranian fears that the United States could success-fully disrupt its command-and-control infrastructure or preemptively destroy its ballistic missile arsenal could also tempt Iran to launch as many missiles as possible early in the war. And the decentralized nature of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, especially its navy, raises the prospect of unauthorized responses that could rapidly expand the fighting in the crowded waters of the Persian Gulf.¶ Controlling escalation would be no easier on the U.S. side. In the face of reprisals by Iranian proxies, "token missile strikes against U.S. bases and ships," or "the harassment of commercial and U.S. naval vessels," Kroenig says that Washington should turn the other cheek and constrain its own response to Iranian counter-attacks. But this is much easier said than done. Just as Iran's likely expectation of a short war might encourage it to respond disproportionately early in the crisis, so the United States would also have incentives to move swiftly to destroy Iran's conventional forces and the infrastructure of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. And if the United States failed to do so, proxy attacks against U.S. civilian personnel in Lebanon or Iraq, the transfer of lethal rocket and portable air defense systems to Taliban fighters in Afghanistan, or missile strikes against U.S. facilities in the Gulf could cause significant U.S. casualties, creating irresistible political pressure in Washington to respond. Add to this the normal fog of war and the lack of reliable communications between the United States and Iran, and Washington would have a hard time determining whether Tehran's initial response to a strike was a one-off event or the prelude to a wider campaign. If it were the latter, a passive U.S. approach might motivate Iran to launch even more dangerous attacks -- and this is a risk Washington may choose not to take. The sum total of these dynamics would make staying within Kroenig's proscribed limits exceedingly difficult.

#### Prefer our evidence – their impact claims are exaggerated and based off useless, unqualified, and overstated studies

**Ruppe, 05** (Global Security Newswire, Biological Terrorism Dangers Overstated, Expert Says, www.nti.org, December 7)

\*\*Citing Anthony Cordesman – Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

U.S. biodefense advocates have been "crying wolf" on the potential for catastrophic bioterrorism, playing up worst-case scenarios and driving billions of dollars into developing questionable defenses against questionable threats, a U.S. military analyst said yesterday (see GSN, March 9). Prominent exercises and arguments since the Sept. 11 attacks suggesting terrorists could effectively use biological weapons to create catastrophic destruction are backed by few facts and little hard, reliable data, said Anthony Cordesman, who holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and is a national security analyst for ABC News. "I'm not convinced that we have been willing to admit the level of uncertainty, the level of difficulty, and the lack of credible data, particularly on an unclassified level," he said, speaking at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars here. While Cordesman acknowledged he has no technical background in biological defense, he does have several decades of government national security experience. That includes shutting down U.S. military biological warfare programs at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in the early 1970s after the United States signed on to the Biological Weapons Convention. Before the offensive programs were terminated, he said, little research was done that decisively showed how to effectively weaponize biological agents — which Cordesman described as producing "stable particulates that are disseminated in the air of a very precise size." "Frankly, we simply did not know how to analyze the impact of weaponization in biological weapons when we terminated our programs," he said. Cordesman also has served as a national security assistant to Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) on the Senate Armed Services Committee, as intelligence assessment director in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and as civilian assistant to the deputy defense secretary. He said commercial experts have questioned the reliability of data developed by U.S. biological weapons designers on the effectiveness of disseminating such deadly agents. Cordesman said any future biological terrorism would most likely be on a limited scale, and that the United States should focus more on preparing to respond to such an incident and discouraging panic than on "planning for the end of the world.""I think it is much more likely it will be a low-level, very crude attack with physiological, political and economic impacts at least initially," he said. Atlantic Storm Cordesman criticized exercises predicating massive casualties from terrorist attacks such as the much-publicized "Atlantic Storm" conducted by several nongovernmental U.S. organizations in January. "Where are these lethality data coming from? Have you ever read the footnotes on them?" Cordesman said. "It's a study done years and years ago that was actually using data derived by somebody else and repeating it again and again." The Atlantic Storm scenario had terrorists enlisting expert help to build aerosolized smallpox weapons used in one day to ultimately infect more than 600,000 people in multiple countries, killing 25 percent of victims. While Cordesman did not participate, he was an "observer" to Atlantic Storm's predecessor, "Dark Winter," which in the summer of 2001 was conducted by many of the same people. Experts criticized that exercise for assuming an initial smallpox transmission rate of 10 people for every person infected and a 33-percent fatality rate, killing as many as 1 million people. "I have almost stopped going to biological war games. I don't find them credible. I don't find them parametric. I don't find people are briefing on the uncertainties involved or creating realistic models for decision makers," he said. "Time and again, they're either valid by focusing on one narrow issue or are simply designed to scare the hell out of everybody and show how important the issue is. The time is over frankly where you should run these models," he said.

#### No bioterrorism and no impact---multiple obstacles

**Stolar 6** Research Officer, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (\*Alex Stolar: October 2006, “BIOTERRORISM AND US POLICY RESPONSES ASSESSING THE THREAT OF MASS CASUALTY,” http://www.ipcs.org/pdf\_file/issue/1659566521IPCS-Special-Report-31.pdf,)//KY

Each of these steps presents significant hurdles for terrorists. Acquiring a strain of a Category A agent which is significantly robust for storage, reproduction, transport, and dispersal, and which has the virulence to infect large numbers to inflict mass casualties is very difficult. Likewise, growing, storing, and transporting biological agents requires substantial financial, logistical, and technological resources, as well as highly trained scientists and technicians. Most of all, according to William Patrick of the US Army Biological Warfare Laboratories, dissemination is the largest hurdle for bioterrorism.4 Indeed, after devoting billions of dollars and years of research, dispersal is still a challenge before US and Russian biological weapons scientists. It is unlikely, at this stage, that terrorists will have the means, sophistication, logistics, or motivation to carry out a bioterrorist attack. Preparing biological agents for an attack is very hard and costly. Despite spending millions of dollars, and several years of work, the Aum Shinrikyo cult was unable to develop an effective biological weapon. Likewise, the 2001 Anthrax attacks in the United States involved very virulent Anthrax spores, but only five persons were killed. More sophisticated spores and dispersal methods would be required for a mass causalty attack. As Professor Milton Leitenberg notes, apart from the Rajneeshee cult attack in 1984, which sickened many, but killed none, “there is apparently no other ‘terrorist’ group that is known to have successfully cultured any pathogen.”5 Moreover, a lingering question is, why would terrorists use bioweapons in an attack? Executing a biological weapon attack is difficult and expensive, and does not suit the modus operandi of the sole group with the means to pursue bioterrorism, Al Qaeda. At present, Al Qaeda favors simple attacks that generate great fear. 9/11 was executed with box cutters; the Madrid train attacks with dynamite purchased from petty criminals6; the London 7/7 bombings utilized simple explosives that could be fashioned with easily available materials and little expertise7; and the terrorists in the recent plot to bomb flights from London to the US intended to use nail polish remover and hair bleach.8 Al Qaeda favors creating great fear at little cost. Why would it stray from this effective formula to bioterrorism which is expensive and of questionable reliability?9 The unavoidable conclusion is that only a nation-state could conduct a bioweapon attack. However, a taboo against using biological weapons exists—not since World War II has one state attacked another with biological weapons. Like non-state actors, states seem to prefer the lower costs and high reliability of conventional weapons or even chemical weapons. Accordingly, it seems the threat of bioterrorism in the near future is low. Neither terrorists nor states seem likely to use bioweapons for attack. Therefore, though possible, it does not seem probable that a mass casualty bioterrorist attack will occur over the next five to ten years. It is unlikely that states will use bioweapons against other states. It is equally unlikely that states will use a terrorist organization as a conduit to attack another state. Only terrorist organizations, operating alone within a weak or failed state, would develop bioweapons for an attack against a state. However, terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda presently lack the expertise, logistics, and equipment for a bioterror attack. In the next five years, it is unlikely that terrorists will acquire such capabilities. Beyond that time frame, what stands between terrorists and potent bioweapons are the policies of individual states and multilateral bioweapon non-proliferation regimes. If the policies of states and the relevant international regimes are robust, terrorists will be unable to mount bioterror attacks. If, on the other hand, these policies and regimes are feeble, or even counterproductive, the threat of bioterrorism will be real and grave. The present circumstances provide great reason for optimism. Unlike nuclear terrorism, there is no imminent threat of biological terrorism. houghtful and effective strategies implemented today can eliminate this threat. How often is this case true in international security? How often can strategists say, this threat could be dangerous in a decade, but is not dangerous now, and can be prevented forever if the right steps are taken? One would think that the world, and the US in particular, would seize this opportunity to prevent this future threat; unfortunately, however, America’s biodefense policies since 9/11 are hurting rather than helping efforts to minimize bioterrorism risks. Bioterrorism presents a grave, but not imminent threat to America and the world. American leadership is needed to make sure terrorists never acquire the ability to execute a mass casualty bioattack. Unfortunately, America’s biodefense strategies are currently increasing the risks of bioterrorism. In the years ahead, those American leaders responsible for protecting the US against bioterrorism should heed the maxim which has served so many doctors so well for so long: Primum non nocere.

#### Empirics go neg.

**Dove 12** [Alan Dove, PhD in Microbiology, science journalist and former Adjunct Professor at New York University, “Who’s Afraid of the Big, Bad Bioterrorist?” Jan 24 2012, http://alandove.com/content/2012/01/whos-afraid-of-the-big-bad-bioterrorist/]

The second problem is much more serious. Eliminating the toxins, we’re left with a list of infectious bacteria and viruses. With a single exception, these organisms are probably near-useless as weapons, and history proves it.¶ There have been at least three well-documented military-style deployments of infectious agents from the list, plus one deployment of an agent that’s not on the list. I’m focusing entirely on the modern era, by the way. There are historical reports of armies catapulting plague-ridden corpses over city walls and conquistadors trying to inoculate blankets with Variola (smallpox), but it’s not clear those “attacks” were effective. Those diseases tended to spread like, well, plagues, so there’s no telling whether the targets really caught the diseases from the bodies and blankets, or simply picked them up through casual contact with their enemies.¶ Of the four modern biowarfare incidents, two have been fatal. The first was the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax incident, which killed an estimated 100 people. In that case, a Soviet-built biological weapons lab accidentally released a large plume of weaponized Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) over a major city. Soviet authorities tried to blame the resulting fatalities on “bad meat,” but in the 1990s Western investigators were finally able to piece together the real story. The second fatal incident also involved anthrax from a government-run lab: the 2001 “Amerithrax” attacks. That time, a rogue employee (or perhaps employees) of the government’s main bioweapons lab sent weaponized, powdered anthrax through the US postal service. Five people died.¶ That gives us a grand total of around 105 deaths, entirely from agents that were grown and weaponized in officially-sanctioned and funded bioweapons research labs. Remember that.¶ Terrorist groups have also deployed biological weapons twice, and these cases are very instructive. The first was the 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack, in which members of a cult in Oregon inoculated restaurant salad bars with Salmonella bacteria (an agent that’s not on the “select” list). 751 people got sick, but nobody died. Public health authorities handled it as a conventional foodborne Salmonella outbreak, identified the sources and contained them. Nobody even would have known it was a deliberate attack if a member of the cult hadn’t come forward afterward with a confession. Lesson: our existing public health infrastructure was entirely adequate to respond to a major bioterrorist attack.¶ The second genuine bioterrorist attack took place in 1993. Members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult successfully isolated and grew a large stock of anthrax bacteria, then sprayed it as an aerosol from the roof of a building in downtown Tokyo. The cult was well-financed, and had many highly educated members, so this release over the world’s largest city really represented a worst-case scenario.¶ Nobody got sick or died. From the cult’s perspective, it was a complete and utter failure. Again, the only reason we even found out about it was a post-hoc confession. Aum members later demonstrated their lab skills by producing Sarin nerve gas, with far deadlier results. Lesson: one of the top “select agents” is extremely hard to grow and deploy even for relatively skilled non-state groups. It’s a really crappy bioterrorist weapon.¶ Taken together, these events point to an uncomfortable but inevitable conclusion: our biodefense industry is a far greater threat to us than any actual bioterrorists.

#### Reforms won’t be large enough to solve

**Ravsberg, 13** – BBC correspondent for Cuba (Fernando, “Cuba’s Economic System: Reform or Change?”, June 20, 2013, http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=95012#sthash.Ev4eCAh6.dpuf)//eek

¶ HAVANA TIMES — Marino Murillo, Vice-Chairman of Cuba’s Council of Ministers and architect of the island’s recent economic reforms, has urged the country to aim for growth by eliminating “all of the obstacles that the current economic model places in the way of the development of the productive forces.”¶ The problem is that the greatest obstacle could be the model itself, which is based on relations of production that hinder the country’s economic development, slow down changes, interfere with reforms and bring about discontent among the population.¶ By implementing this socialist model, which dates back to Stalin’s time, Cuba obtained the same results seen in all other countries which copied it: agricultural production crises, industrial stagnation, shortages and a disaffected citizenry.¶ Murillo invoked socialism’s theoretical forefathers, who said that the new, socialist society would need to nationalize only the “fundamental means of production”, a prescription that wasn’t exactly followed by a model which placed even junk food stands in State hands.¶ To be at all effective, every economic change essayed in the country today, no matter how small, invariably demands a whole series of subsequent reforms. And it is precisely there where the model, and its defenders, prevent the reform from becoming effective or yielding its best results.¶ Though the Cuban government’s official discourse itself is calling for a “rejuvenation” of the country’s model, the fact of the matter is that it will be next to impossible to fit a new piece into this jigsaw puzzle without altering the pieces around it, without producing a domino-effect that will ultimately change the entire pattern.¶ Though the Cuban government’s official discourse itself is calling for a “rejuvenation” of the country’s model, the fact of the matter is that it will be next to impossible to fit a new piece into this jigsaw puzzle without altering the pieces around it, without producing a domino-effect that will ultimately change the entire pattern.¶ The government runs into these obstacles every time it attempts to move one of the pieces of the puzzle. When it decided to hand over State-controlled lands to the peasants, officials invoked Cuba’s “current legislation” to forbid farmers to set up their homes in farm areas.¶ Such absurd restrictions discouraged many and pushed others to quit the food production sector altogether and devote themselves to securing construction materials illegally, so as to be able to build a home elsewhere, far from prying looks.¶ Massive and hugely inefficient, the agricultural sector may well be the very paradigm of bureaucratic mismanagement, but it is far from being its only expression in the country. Cuba’s import system is a true bureaucratic gem, in which producers are those with the least say in official decisions.¶ A Cuban factory wishing to import a piece of equipment from abroad is required to approach the importing company assigned to it by the State. Technically speaking, this “importer” does not actually import anything – it merely puts out a bid among foreign companies with offices in Cuba.¶ Employees from these companies are the ones who travel to the manufacturing country, purchase the equipment and bring it back to Cuba. Under the country’s current model, the manager of a Cuban factory is expressly forbidden from contacting the foreign export company directly.¶ Thus, the person who makes the order is an office clerk who knows little or nothing about what the company needs and who, in the best of scenarios, will opt for the cheapest piece of equipment available, something which often leads to serious production problems later.¶ The status quo relations of production continue to find support in Cuba, from the defenders of “Real Socialism.” Ironically, or not surprisingly, most of them are isolated from the reality of this socialist system, enjoying government perks that compensate for the “small inconveniences” of everyday life.¶ In the worst cases, these “intermediating State importers” are bribed by foreign companies so that they will purchase obsolete or poor-quality equipment. In recent weeks, Cuban courts tried hundreds of State employees implicated in these types of “deals”.¶ These are the “relations of production” which keep equipment in Cuban factories paralyzed for months, waiting for the needed spare parts, while State importers take all the time in the world to decide what to purchase.

#### State bureaucracy greatest threat to economic reform- easing won’t help

**Restakis 12** - executive director of the BC Co-operative Association (John, “Can co-operatives revive Cuba's sagging economy?”, 9/19/12, <http://socialenterprise.guardian.co.uk/social-enterprise-network/2012/sep/19/cooperatives-revive-cuba-sagging-economy>)//EK

Cuba's leaders hope that a combination of co-operative restructuring and independent entrepreneurship will take up the slack. Without further measures to free the economy from state controls this is not likely. But beyond this, there looms what is perhaps the single greatest threat to reform in Cuba – the state bureaucracy. For the thousands of functionaries that handle the patronage networks of the state and its enterprises, reform can only mean trimming back the powers that bestow their status and livelihoods. They will resist change at every turn. Ultimately, the future of socialism in Cuba rests on its leaders accepting that society is not the state and that the interests of the two are not the same. The survival of socialism depends on finding economic models that marry the ideals of solidarity and equity and social justice with that of open markets and free people. Co-operatives are a natural choice but it will take additional risk from its leadership and a trust in their people to make this bold experiment work. Despite the enormity of the challenge, and the grip the old socialist ideas still have on the political imagination, there is an unbounded pride in Cuba born of struggle and endurance against impossible odds. Cubans are survivors. They are resourceful and innovative, and among the most educated people in Latin America. Given the chance, they have created thousands of enterprises everywhere in the small spaces and crannies opened up by the new freedoms. And if Cuba's leaders can place their trust in their people, and in the endurance of the ideals they have fought so hard to protect, the co-operative economy they hope to build might yet forge a new kind of civic socialism for a world in desperate need of new visions.

#### Economic reform will fail until government reforms

**Campos 13** – writer for Havana Times (Pedro, Havana Times, “Cuba’s Burning Economic Contradictions”, July 8, 2013, <http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=96009>)//EK

In truth, the issue is clear: once we accept that the so-called “State socialism” model has failed, the only thing left for the Cuban economy is to advance decidedly towards privatization, as in China and Russia; or towards the socialization of property and full appropriation of the economy by the people – true socialism as demanded by the democratic socialists. But the evolution in either direction is being blocked by the central bureaucratic apparatus, determined to maintain absolute control over the country’s economic and political system. As a result, the “updating” is neither consistent with the needs of private capitalism, nor with a true socialist economy in which freely associated forms of production predominate. - See more at: http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=96009#sthash.MvrG0lTG.dpuf

#### Multilateral coop will always structurally fail regardless of their internal link

**Barma et al., 13** (Naazneen, assistant professor of national-security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School; Ely Ratner, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security; and Steven Weber, professor of political science and at the School of Information at the University of California, Berkeley, March/April 2013, “The Mythical Liberal Order,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/the-mythical-liberal-order-8146)

Assessed against its ability to solve global problems, the current system is falling progressively further behind on the most important challenges, including financial stability, the “responsibility to protect,” and coordinated action on climate change, nuclear proliferation, cyberwarfare and maritime security. The authority, legitimacy and capacity of multilateral institutions dissolve when the going gets tough—when member countries have meaningfully different interests (as in currency manipulations), when the distribution of costs is large enough to matter (as in humanitarian crises in sub-Saharan Africa) or when the shadow of future uncertainties looms large (as in carbon reduction). Like a sports team that perfects exquisite plays during practice but fails to execute against an actual opponent, global-governance institutions have sputtered precisely when their supposed skills and multilateral capital are needed most. ¶ WHY HAS this happened? The hopeful liberal notion that these failures of global governance are merely reflections of organizational dysfunction that can be fixed by reforming or “reengineering” the institutions themselves, as if this were a job for management consultants fiddling with organization charts, is a costly distraction from the real challenge. A decade-long effort to revive the dead-on-arrival Doha Development Round in international trade is the sharpest example of the cost of such a tinkering-around-the-edges approach and its ultimate futility. Equally distracting and wrong is the notion held by neoconservatives and others that global governance is inherently a bad idea and that its institutions are ineffective and undesirable simply by virtue of being supranational. ¶ The root cause of stalled global governance is simpler and more straightforward. “Multipolarization” has come faster and more forcefully than expected. Relatively authoritarian and postcolonial emerging powers have become leading voices that undermine anything approaching international consensus and, with that, multilateral institutions. It’s not just the reasonable demand for more seats at the table. That might have caused something of a decline in effectiveness but also an increase in legitimacy that on balance could have rendered it a net positive.¶ Instead, global governance has gotten the worst of both worlds: a decline in both effectiveness and legitimacy. The problem is not one of a few rogue states acting badly in an otherwise coherent system. There has been no real breakdown per se. There just wasn’t all that much liberal world order to break down in the first place. The new voices are more than just numerous and powerful. They are truly distinct from the voices of an old era, and they approach the global system in a meaningfully different way.¶

#### Tons of alt causes - powerful states bypass organizations, UN bureaucracy and systematic factors

**Thakur 11**– (Ramesh, Professor of International Relations and Foundation Director of the Centre for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament at the Australian National University in Canberra, “The United Nations in Global Governance: Rebalancing Organized Multilateralism for Current andFuture Challenges”<http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/65/initiatives/GlobalGovernance/Thakur_GA_Thematic_Debate_on_UN_in_GG.pdf>) DF

In an interdependent, globalized and networked world,multilateralism will continue to be a key aspect of international relations. Limitations do and always will exist. The utility and effectiveness of formal multilateral institutions are, inevitably, conditioned and constrained by the exigencies of power. Powerful states may work through or around multilateral institutions at their pleasure and selectively. Some issues may defy multilateral approaches. Changing normative expectations may cast doubt on the¶ constitutive values of specific international institutions. But the theoretical rationale of¶I nstitutionalism – that all states benefit from a world in which agreed rules and common¶ norms bind the behaviour of all actors – is broadly intact and indisputable.¶All actors depend upon multilateralism and the underwriting of regularity and public¶ goods in the international system. But if they are to remain viable, international organizations and the values of multilateralism embedded in them must be reconstituted in line with 21st century principles of governance and legitimacy. Just a simportantly, they must be capable of addressing contemporary challenges effectively. This may involve moving beyond the original roots of multilateralism, reassessing the values on which¶ multilateralism is based and promoted, and recognizing that contemporary and prospective challenges call for more agility, nimbleness, flexibility, adaptability and anticipatory rather than always reactive solutions.¶ At the centre of the existing multilateral order is the United Nations. Of course one part¶of the United Nations is an international bureaucracy with many failings and flaws and a¶ forum often used for finger pointing, not problem solving. Too often hasit demonstrated¶a failure to tackle urgent collective action problems due to institutionalized inability,¶ incapacity or unwillingness. Yet the world body remains the embodiment of the¶international community, the focus of international expectations and the locus of¶collective action as the symbol of an imagined and constructed community of strangers.¶Moreover, the UN record since 1945 demonstrates an under‐appreciated capacity for¶policy innovation, institutional adaptation and organizational learning, for example with¶respect to peacekeeping gmissions.That said, without continual structural and procedural reforms, the legitimacy and¶performance deficits will accumulate and there will be an intensifying crisis of confidence¶in the world’s system of organized multilateralism centred on the United Nations. The¶values and institutions of formalized multilateralism as currently constituted are neither¶optimally effective nor legitimate. The chief multilateral organizations do not meet¶current standards of representivity, consent, juridical accountability, rule of law, broad¶participation, and transparency – and therefore political legitimacy. This is an acute¶problem precisely because international organizations play an increasingly important and¶intrusive role in people’s lives. The more this happens, the more people will realize that¶multilateralism is value‐laden, connoting fundamental social and political choices¶regarding the balance between the market and equity, human rights, governance, and¶democracy. A range of public policy decisions and practices have been transferred to the¶international level,raising a number of pressing normative challenges to the Westphalian foundations o fmultilateralism as citizens become rights holders and states are deemed to¶have responsibilities of sovereignty.¶That is, the challenge to the values and institutions of multilateralism results not merely¶For many particular distribution of power, but also from systemic factors like the nature ofthe state, the nature of power, the nature of security and threats to international security, the actors who drive security and insecurity, and the global norms that regulate the international behaviour of state and nonstate actors alike.

#### Multilateralism empirically doesn’t solve anything – four reasons

**Harvey, 4** – University Research Professor of International Relations, professor in the Department of Political Science, and the director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University (Frank, Smoke And Mirrors: Globalized Terrorism And The Illusion Of Multilateral Security, p. 43-45)//VP

The typical argument favouring multilateralism is a simple one, sum- marized by Ramesh Thakur: ‘Because the world is essentially anarchi- cal, it is fundamentally insecure, characterized by strategic uncertainty and complexity because of too many actors with multiple goals and interests and variable capabilities and convictions. Collective action embedded in international institutions that mirror mainly U.S. value preferences and interests enhances predictability, reduces uncertainty, and cuts the transaction costs of intemational action.’" With respect to peacekeeping, for example, Thakur argues that if ‘the UN helps to mute the costs and spread the risks of the terms of intemational engagement to maximise these benefits, the United States will need to instill in others, as well as itself embrace, the principle of multilateralism as a norm in its own right: states must do X because the United Nations has called for X, and good states do what the United Nations asks them to do.’l2 But there are several problems with Thakur's defence of collective action and associated policy recommendations, particularly in relation to multilateral approaches to security in a post-9/11 setting. First, and foremost, state leaders often refuse to do what the UN asks of them, are often more than prepared to have their publics suffer the consequences of whatever sanctions the UN can mount, and are rarely directly affected by the sanctions that are implemented – assuming the permanent members of the Security Council find it in their collective interest to implement a sanctions regime in the first place. The lessons from UN intervention and sanction efforts over the past decade are not at all encouraging in this regard. Second, many state and non-state actors fall outside the institutional constraints imposed on the system through global norms and regimes. As the capacity spreads for smaller and smaller groups to inflict increasingly devastating levels of damage on larger states, international institutions will lose the capacity to force or coerce compliance with international law. Consequently, leaders of major powers, such as the United States, will be compelled to respond to security threats through unilateral initiatives. This compulsion will force other powers to push that much harder to control American impulses by demanding that multilateral consensus remain the sole guarantor of legitimacy. These tensions will be exacerbated by the prevailing perception in the United States that these same multilateral institutions are constraining the power and capacity of the U.S. government to protect American citizens from emerging threats of terrorism and proliferation. Third, the collective-action argument put forward by Thai-cur typically (and erroneously) assumes that most states are governed by a similar set of political priorities, share common concerns about similar combinations of security threats, are stimulated into action (or inaction) by the same set of economic imperatives, are inspired by a common set of interests and overarching values (such as peace, security, stability), and are encouraged by their respective publics to meet their demands for a common set of public goods. But the differences, tensions, and overall level of competition among states in the system are far greater than proponents of multilateralism acknowledge. Some states are more threatened by terrorism and proliferation than others, have more substantial and direct economic interest in particular regions, are less interested in securing peace, and experience pressure from their respective publics to pursue very distinct foreign and security policies. Consequently, there is no guarantee that a collection of states will have the same motivation to change the status quo, or experience the same imperative to address the same security threats with the same level of resolve, commitment, or resources (relative to their size). In sum, multi- lateral organizations are less likely today to act with the same level of urgency to address security threats that Washington considers imperative. The costs of inaction (derived from exclusive reliance on multilateral consensus) are now perceived as being higher than the costs of unilateralism. Although similar threats may have guided collective action through multilateral alliances for much of the cold war, these imperatives were a product of a common Soviet threat. But threats today are many and varied, and few states share the same concerns or face the same obligations to respond. No case more clearly illustrates the growing divisions among former allies than the 2003 Iraq war. Fourth, decreasing transaction costs may be a valid argument in favour of multilateral cooperation in some cases (e. g., to facilitate post- conflict reconstruction, political reforms, democratization, elections run by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, food aid, water distribution, and the provision of medical supplies and facilities), but this is not true for all security challenges. In a post-9/11 environment, the transaction costs that are saved through joint efforts will always be compared with the costs of depending exclusively on collective-action mechanisms that ultimately may fail - multilateralism is not free of costs or risks. For example, one of the many important lessons of the 2003 Iraq war, at least for American officials, is that there are no collective-security guarantees any longer, even from traditional allies. The UN Security Council did not function as a separate entity committed to facilitating and coordinating diplomatic exchanges towards a common good. The UN functions in a highly competitive environment in which traditional power politics plays out. Proponents of multilateralism through the UNSC do not espouse that doctrine in the interest of global security; their efforts are typically designed to use the institution to limit the capacity of the U.S. to act unilaterally to protect American interests. That level of competition, itself driven by competing interpretations of interests, values, and threats, does not lend itself well to the kind of multilateralism its proponents aspire to achieve. Of course, if France shared the same concerns about terrorism, or if leaders in Paris were equally motivated to address the potential for WMD proliferation in and through Iraq, the transaction costs incurred by responding through the UN would be more acceptable. But as threat perceptions continue to diverge, the risks associated with waiting for multilateral consensus are simply too high. The complex nature of contemporary security threats virtually guarantees that similar conflicts will plague multilateral institutions in the future.

#### Prefer our evidence --- there are institutional and professional reasons to inflate the risk of terrorism

**Mueller, 04** (John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center at Ohio State University, Regulation, Fall)

In addition, it should be pointed out that the response to September 11 has created a vast and often well-funded terrorism industry. Its members would be nearly out of business if terrorism were to be back-burnered, and accordingly they have every competitive incentive (and they are nothing if not competitive) to conclude that it is their civic duty to keep the pot boiling. Moreover, there is more reputational danger in underplaying risks than in exaggerating them. People routinely ridicule futurist H.G. Wells’ prediction that the conflict beginning in 1914 would be “the war that will end war,” but not his equally confident declaration at the end of World War II that “the end of everything we call life is close at hand.” Disproved doomsayers can always claim that caution induced by their warnings prevented the predicted calamity from occurring. (Call this the Y2K effect.) Disproved Pollyannas have no such convenient refuge.

# 1nr

#### Here’s part of US code that substantiates this

Title 22-FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE CHAPTER 69A-CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY (LIBERTAD) SUBCHAPTER II-ASSISTANCE TO FREE AND INDEPENDENT CUBA

§6064. Termination of economic embargo of Cuba

(a) Presidential actions

Upon submitting a determination to the appropriate congressional committees under section 6063(c)(1) of this title that a transition government in Cuba is in power, the President, after consultation with the Congress, is authorized to take steps to suspend the economic embargo of Cuba and to suspend the right of action created in section 6082 of this title with respect to actions thereafter filed against the Cuban Government, to the extent that such steps contribute to a stable foundation for a democratically elected government in Cuba.

(b) Suspension of certain provisions of law

In carrying out subsection (a) of this section, the President may suspend the enforcement of—

(1) section 2370(a) of this title;

(2) section 2370(f) of this title with respect to the “Republic of Cuba”;

(3) sections 6003, 6004(d), and 6005 of this title;

(4) section 902(c) of the Food Security Act of 1985; and

(5) the prohibitions on transactions described in part 515 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.

(c) Additional Presidential actions

Upon submitting a determination to the appropriate congressional committees under section 6063(c)(3) of this title that a democratically elected government in Cuba is in power, the President shall take steps to terminate the economic embargo of Cuba, including the restrictions under part 515 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.

(d) Conforming amendments

On the date on which the President submits a determination under section 6063(c)(3) of this title—

(1) section 2370(a) of this title is repealed;

(2) section 2370(f) of this title is amended by striking “Republic of Cuba”;

(3) sections 6003, 6004(d), and 6005 of this title are repealed; and

(4) section 902(c) of the Food Security Act of 1985 is repealed.

(e) Review of suspension of economic embargo

(1) Review

If the President takes action under subsection (a) of this section to suspend the economic embargo of Cuba, the President shall immediately so notify the Congress. The President shall report to the Congress no less frequently than every 6 months thereafter, until he submits a determination under section 6063(c)(3) of this title that a democratically elected government in Cuba is in power, on the progress being made by Cuba toward the establishment of such a democratically elected government. The action of the President under subsection (a) of this section shall cease to be effective upon the enactment of a joint resolution described in paragraph (2).

(2) Joint resolutions

For purposes of this subsection, the term “joint resolution” means only a joint resolution of the 2 Houses of Congress, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: “That the Congress disapproves the action of the President under section 204(a) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 to suspend the economic embargo of Cuba, notice of which was submitted to the Congress on \_\_\_\_.”, with the blank space being filled with the appropriate date.

(3) Referral to committees

Joint resolutions introduced in the House of Representatives shall be referred to the Committee on International Relations and joint resolutions introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

(4) Procedures

(A) Any joint resolution shall be considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.

(B) For the purpose of expediting the consideration and enactment of joint resolutions, a motion to proceed to the consideration of any joint resolution after it has been reported by the appropriate committee shall be treated as highly privileged in the House of Representatives.

(C) Not more than 1 joint resolution may be considered in the House of Representatives and the Senate in the 6-month period beginning on the date on which the President notifies the Congress under paragraph (1) of the action taken under subsection (a) of this section, and in each 6-month period thereafter.

(Pub. L. 104–114, title II, §204, Mar. 12, 1996, 110 Stat. 810.)

References in Text

Section 902(c) of the Food Security Act of 1985, referred to in subsecs. (b)(4) and (d)(4), is section 902(c) of Pub. L. 99–198, which is set out as a note under section 1446g of Title 7, Agriculture.

Section 204(a) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, referred to in subsec. (e)(2), is subsec. (a) of this section.

Section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, referred to in subsec. (e)(4)(A), is section 601(b) of Pub. L. 94–329, title VI, June 30, 1976, 90 Stat. 765, which is not classified to the Code.

Change of Name

Committee on International Relations of House of Representatives changed to Committee on Foreign Affairs of House of Representatives by House Resolution No. 6, One Hundred Tenth Congress, Jan. 5, 2007.

#### Historic causation proves

**Gat 13**

Azar, Department of Political Science, University of Tel Aviv, Is war declining – and why?, Journal of Peace Research March 2013 vol. 50 no. 2 149-157

So if wars have not become more costly and destructive during the past two centuries then why have they receded, particularly in the developed world? The answer is the advent of the industrial–commercial revolution after 1815, the most profound transformation of human society since the Neolithic adoption of agriculture. The correlation between the decline of war in the developed world and the process of modernization, both unfolding since 1815, is surely not accidental, and the causation is not difficult to locate. In the first place, given explosive growth in per capita wealth, about 30- to 50-fold thus far, the Malthusian trap has been broken. Wealth no longer constitutes a fundamentally finite quantity, and wealth acquisition progressively shifted away from a zero-sum game. Secondly, economies are no longer overwhelmingly autarkic, instead having become increasingly interconnected by specialization, scale, and exchange. Consequently, foreign devastation potentially depressed the entire system and was thus detrimental to a state’s own wellbeing. This reality, already noted by Mill (1848/1961: 582), starkly manifested itself after World War I, as Keynes (1920) had anticipated in his criticism of the reparations imposed on Germany. Thirdly, greater economic openness has decreased the likelihood of war by disassociating economic access from the confines of political borders and sovereignty. It is no longer necessary to politically possess a territory in order benefit from it. Of the above three factors, the second one – commercial interdependence – has attracted most of the attention in the literature. But the other two factors have been no less significant.¶ Thus, the greater the yield of competitive economic cooperation, the more counterproductive and less attractive conflict becomes. Rather than war becoming more costly, as is widely believed, it is in fact peace that has been growing more profitable. Referring to my argument in this regard, Levy & Thompson (2011: 72–75) excused themselves from deciding on the issue on the grounds of insufficient information regarding the cost of premodern war. But as already noted, the information on the subject is quite clear.

#### That’s a review of recent literature on the causes of war

Gat 13

Azar, Department of Political Science, University of Tel Aviv, Is war declining – and why?, Journal of Peace Research March 2013 vol. 50 no. 2 149-157

The article reviews and assesses the recent literature that claims a sharp decrease in fighting and violent mortality rate since prehistory and during recent times. It also inquires into the causes of this decrease. The article supports the view, firmly established over the past 15 years and unrecognized by only one of the books reviewed, that the first massive decline in violent mortality occurred with the emergence of the state-Leviathan. Hobbes was right, and Rousseau was wrong, about the great violence of the human state of nature. The rise of the state-Leviathan greatly reduced in-group violent mortality by establishing internal peace. Less recognized, it also decreased out-group war fatalities. Although state wars appear large in absolute terms, large states actually meant lower mobilization rates and reduced exposure of the civilian population to war. A second major step in the decline in the frequency and fatality of war has occurred over the last two centuries, including in recent decades. However, the exact periodization of, and the reasons for, the decline are a matter of dispute among the authors reviewed. Further, the two World Wars constitute a sharp divergence from the trend, which must be accounted for. The article surveys possible factors behind the decrease, such as industrialization and rocketing economic growth, commercial interdependence, the liberal-democratic peace, social attitude change, nuclear deterrence, and UN peacekeeping forces. It argues that contrary to the claim of some of the authors reviewed, war has not become more lethal and destructive over the past two centuries, and thus this factor cannot be the cause of war's decline. Rather, it is peace that has become more profitable. At the same time, the specter of war continues to haunt the parts of the world less affected by many of the above developments, and the threat of unconventional terror is real and troubling.

#### Court clog from new litigation independently destroys the economy

**Fix-Fierro**, Circuit Master Judge, **3** (Hector, Courts, Justice, & Efficiency: A Social Justice Legal Study of Economic Rationality in Adjudication, p. 123)

Regarding the second question, ie, competition between legal systems121 and the role of courts in such a process, legal rules obviously serve as an important instrument for attracting foreign trade and investment by creating comparative economic advantages. After all, this is the logic that lies behind the impressive transformation that the legal systems of many countries experienced in the 1980s and 1990s towards economic and political liberalisation, with considerable success.122 In this context, and as has already been stated, domestic courts play an important role as a factor in the general climate of economic and political stability, as well as of legal certainty, that favors investment, trade and, ultimately, growth. In fact, the perception that domestic courts are ineffective and inefficient, or that their judgments and interpretations may reduce economic opportunities, will weigh heavily on the decision-making process of foreign {and domestic) economic actors.123

#### Destroys leverage – Espino proves Cuba has no incentive to ratify an investment treaty if the US has already removed the embargo – it’s a key incentive

**Currie, ’10** (Duncan, June 7, “Spare Not the Stick” National Review, EbscoHost)

The broader U.S. embargo should be used as a tool to incentivize Cuban liberalization. Latell reckons that most senior¶ members of the military and Communist¶ bureaucracy—including Raúl Castro—¶ favor Chinese-style economic reforms,¶ though they do not necessarily want Cuba¶ to become what China is today. But Fidel¶ rejects the Deng Xiaoping model, and any¶ large-scale implementation of that model¶ presupposes his death. Latell suspects that¶ if Fidel died and Raúl (who turns 79 on¶ June 3) were still in control as president,¶ Havana would adopt a more pragmatic¶ approach to the United States, and might¶ even be willing to free political prisoners¶ in return for U.S. investment.¶ If America ditched sanctions tomorrow¶ without first obtaining serious concessions, it would be rewarding the Cuban¶ government at a time when that government appears increasingly vulnerable. The¶ embargo may seem a hopeless anachronism. But it could prove a valuable bargaining chip, and it’s worth keeping at¶ least a little while longer.

#### Resolution of property must happen first

**Travieso-Diaz**, Partner at Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, **’95** (Matias- JD Columbia University and PhD Ohio State, Summer, “Some Legal And Practical Issues In The Resolution Of Cuban Nationals' Expropriation Claims Against Cuba” Journal of International Business Law, 16 U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L. 217, lexis)

The outstanding property claims of both U.S. and Cuban nationals raise an important issue that will need to be addressed in the early stages of Cuba's free-market transition. There are several reasons why the early resolution of this issue is urgent: (1) U.S. laws require resolution of U.S. citizen expropriation claims before foreign aid can resume; n16 (2) the Cuban Government will need to give early resolution to the outstanding expropriation claims to assure domestic order and [\*222] political and economic stability, expedite privatization, and foster foreign investment; n17 and (3) resolution of the claims issue will diminish the perceived political risks of investing in Cuba. Political risks are a matter of concern to prospective investors, traders, and financial institutions. n18

#### The Cuba takings alone aren’t the problem – the aff sets a precedent for unlimited takings claims against the government that can’t be controlled

**DeGennaro**, Executive Director of Taxpayers for Common Sense, 4-14-**99** (Ralph, “Land-Owners Equal Treatment Act,” FDCH Congressional Testimony)

H.R. 1142 Would Create New Uncontrollable, Unpredictable Entitlement Prouam Nobody should vote for this bill under the illusion that it will be no big deal in the federal budget. It is true that compensation payments pursuant to H.R. 1142 would be technically "subject to the availability of appropriations". But enactment of H.R. 1142 would create a legitimate expectation of compensation. The only thing worse than enacting H.R. 1142 would be for Congress to enact it with the intention of somehow avoiding paying every penny of every claim qualified under the terms of H.R. 1142. Because Congress would of course want to keep any promise implied in H.R. 1142, enactment of the bill would in essence create an entitlement program. The cost ceiling of this new spending program would be almost impossible to control or predict. Federal agencies would be overwhelmed by claims. The Budget and Appropriations Committees would ultimately be responsible for writing and approving funding bills that somehow both allocated money to ongoing activities and paid compensation claims. Doing this within any set budget caps would be almost impossible. Furthermore, this payment scheme would have significant unintended consequences and likely lead to more supplemental appropriations bills to pay unexpectedly large claims. Supplemental appropriations bills are already among the most abused aspect of the budget process, and H.R. 1142 would likely make it much worse. H.R. 1142 Would Leave the Government Liable for Hundreds of Millions, if Not Billions TCS believes that the true cost scenario could conceivably have no limit. In 1995, the Congressional Budget Of-fice stated that for S. 605, the Omnibus Private Property Rights Act of 1995, CBO had "no basis for estimating the additional amount of compensation that the government might have to pay for cases where property owners choose to pursue larger claims in court." Although this statement was in reference to legislation that applied to a greater number of programs, it is still applicable to a bill that targets only the Endangered Species Act, due to the broad criteria for com-pensation established in H.R. 1142.

#### It’s not a conditions counterplan, it’s a sequenced engagement counterplan --- the CP signals US goodwill that brings Cuba back to the table

**Meacham, ‘9** (Carl, Senior Adviser Latin America and the Caribbean for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 23, “Changing Cuba Policy - in the United States National Interest” Staff Trip Report, https://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2009\_rpt/cuba.pdf

The regime appears to be open to some bilateral dialogue and cooperation Staff's meetings with GOC officials revealed stark differences between Cuban and U.S. priorities in bilateral relations. Most of the U.S. policy reforms that are proposed in Washington center on liberalizing travel to the island, yet the GOC considers travel to be a domestic issue for the United States and therefore of less relevance to bilateral discussions. Most importantly, the GOC views the USG's emphasis on conditionality (i.e., lifting U.S. economic sanctions in return for concrete movement toward democracy) as an unlikely starting point for future negotiations. When staff asked GOC officials about the human rights situation and the plight of Cuban dissidents, GOC officials countered with Guantanamo,\8\ Abu Ghraib, and the case of the ``Cuban Five.'' \9\ When staff asked about what gestures the Cuban government would find positive, officials expressed concerns with programs by USAID intended to facilitate a transition to democracy in Cuba as well as Radio and TV Marti broadcasts from Miami, which are intended to provide an alternative source of information for the Cuban people. They view these programs as interventionist tools of the United States intended to bring about regime change. On issues of national security and commerce, however, the GOC indicated a willingness to cooperate with the United States where mutual interests exist, echoing previous statements by Raul Castro on his desire for dialogue with the USG. Since assuming power in 2006, he has made several overtures to engage in dialogue with the United States with the condition that the dialogue is based on the principles of equality, reciprocity, non-interference, and mutual respect.\10\ According to State Department sources, the USG has also made overtures over the last 18 months to discuss narco-trafficking and current restrictions on travel for diplomats in Havana and Washington, but these efforts have proven unsuccessful thus far. Recommendatons According to a recently published book on U.S. policy towards Cuba, only three avenues of regular official communication exist with the GOC: monthly meetings between U.S. and Cuban military officers at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, occasional cooperation between the U.S. and Cuban coast guards on drug enforcement and migration matters (through a U.S. Coast Guard attache at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana), and frequent contact between U.S. and Cuban meteorologists who track hurricanes in the Caribbean.\11\ Given these precedents and the current state of U.S.-Cuban relations, staff concluded that progress could be attained by replacing conditionality with sequenced engagement, beginning with narrow areas of consensus that develop trust. A steady series of gradual measures has significant confidence-building potential and could ultimately create the conditions for effective dialogue over more contentious issues. By sequencing this process of engagement with Cuba, the USG would have the opportunity to continually reassess progress towards the advancement of national interests. In other words, a pragmatic, phased approach would allow the USG to halt the engagement process at any point if U.S. interests were no longer being served. Staff recommends assessing the viability of reinstating discussions on drug interdiction and migration, and incremental steps in other areas, in order to address issues of concern for both countries. These measures should build upon each other to establish new foundations for dialogue. Initially, increased communication and cooperation between the GOC and USG can take place within the framework of the existing embargo, though staff suggests consideration of several exceptions to U.S. sanctions as talks progress, as detailed below.

#### Cuba already wants the counterplan, the problem is the US saying no --- the counterplan is the US saying yes.

**Ashby, ’11** (Timothy- Deputy Assistant Secretary Western Hemisphere for the Department of Commerce, Director of the Office of Mexico and the Caribbean for the U.S. Commerce Department’s International Trade Administration and Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, November 22, “Helping Cuban Reforms Through Agricultural Trade” http://www.coha.org/helping-cuban-reforms-through-agricultural-trade/)

The President retains ultimate decision-making authority as to which countries and products are eligible for GSP status. There are certain mandatory criteria that countries must measure up to in order to be considered eligible for GSP treatment. Of particular interest with respect to Cuba, communist countries are not eligible for GSP treatment “unless the country receives Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status , is a World Trade Organization (WTO) member and a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and is not dominated by international communism.”[1] In addition, a GSP beneficiary “may not have nationalized, expropriated or otherwise seized property of U.S. citizens or corporations without providing, or taking steps to provide, prompt, adequate and effective compensation, or submitting such issues to a mutually agreed forum for arbitration.”[2] While certain products from Cuba would certainly be eligible for GSP status, the mandatory country requirements present additional hurdles for preferential trade treatment for Havana to qualify outside of the current political climate. However, these are not insurmountable. For example, Cuba repeatedly has offered to negotiate the settlement of claims for expropriated U.S. property, and since the demise of the Soviet Union, could not be considered to be dominated by “international communism”.

#### Normalization is different than normalize – the counterplan may be part of the process of normalization, but the plan text says they normalize relations which mandate zero sanctions remain in the plan

**Pfister**, now a Professor of Communications at University of Nebraska-Lincoln, **and Jarvis, ’99** (Damien and Jason, last date cited, “Normalization Topic Wording Paper” http://debate.uvm.edu/wppfister.html)

In the foreign policy literature concerning pariah states, "normalize" is used often. Literally, it means, "to make normal," and this is how scholars in the field utilize the word. The trick with crafting a resolution utilizing "normalize" is, of course, the division of ground. Many scholars indicate anything that makes relations "more normal," for example, humanitarian assistance, trade agreements, etc, is a "normalization" of relations. This would make negative ground more difficult to predict, as "normalization" would be similar to "change" with a direction. However, the verb form of normalization, normalize, might solve many of these problems since it suggests a particular goal and end point within the context of a specific policy. Affirmatives would be forced to create a policy that "normalizes" relations, rather than merely advocate a policy that falls under the purview of a process of normalization. As the definitions section below explains, normalize suggests an endpoint reached in which relations are "normal." This definition might prevent affirmatives from lifting just one economic sanction, since that action would leave other economic sanctions in place, and thus not be "normal" economic relations. The contextual definitions lend credence to this interpretation.

#### Defer to contextual definitions over dictionary ones – the counterplan is a precondition to normalizing relations but that is distinct from actual normalizing which is what the plan mandates

**Pfister**, now a Professor of Communications at University of Nebraska-Lincoln, **and Jarvis, ’99** (Damien and Jason, last date cited, “Normalization Topic Wording Paper” http://debate.uvm.edu/wppfister.html)

Definitions: The most difficult task in researching this wording was to determine what constitutes "normalization" of relations with another country. While the term is used throughout the foreign policy literature, very few sources actually provide coherent explanations of what is, and is not, "normalization." However, there are a few books that actually provide an "official" definition. As we will discuss below, the lack of formal definitions has its advantages and drawbacks. The primary drawback to the term normalization is the potential for affirmatives to interpret the term broadly to allow any affirmative that "does something" with a topic nation. The "dictionary" definitions (Webster's, and foreign policy dictionaries, etc.) would seem to allow expansive interpretations of the word as it would appear in the resolution. However, there are two reasons that the resolution that we advocate below does not fall into that trap. First, the contextual usage of the terms "normalize" and "normalization" provide immediate (though somewhat inconsistent) checks on affirmative ground. In the discussion of the first resolution, we offer the example of a case that might unfreeze Iranian Assets in an attempt to normalize economic relations with Iran. An interview with a senior Iranian diplomat indicates that unfreezing assets is a good idea, but that such an action would be a pre-condition for taking actions to normalize relations. However, releasing the assets would not constitute normalization itself. Subsequently, the affirmative would not be topical, and can be contextually defended as negative counterplan ground. A side benefit of the wide usage of the term in the literature will be intricate, lively and innovative topicality debates. These topicality debates would not overshadow the substantive issues, however, since the literature provides a substantive check on possible affirmative cases. Second, use of specific modifiers will prevent the "send beanie babies to Sudan" affirmative. Exclusion of "cultural normalization" from the topic will prevent small affirmatives that take actions that would not constitute fundamental changes in current American foreign policy.

#### 2) Counterplan is not the process by which the plan is implemented

#### Normal relations must be applied immediately, the counterplan only results in it

**Nelson**, Director of International Security Program at Atlantic Council, **’95** (C Richard, “A Road Map for Restructuring Future US Relations with Cuba” Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume5/pdfs/FILE35.pdf)

Restoring normal relations will require immediate lifting of the trade embargo and other economic sanctions. The U.S. government should also encourage a process which facilitates the granting of Most Favored Nation status to Cuba. The Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation should take the lead in expanding incentive programs for U.S.- based trade and investment, assuming that Cuba has embarked on a plan for resolving its outstanding debt and meets other normal requirements by these institutions.

#### Successful restitution alone solves relations – also a DA to the aff because failure to resolve it makes relations collapse inevitable

**Espino**, JD Candidate Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, ‘**8** (Daniel- President and Chairman of the Board of Puente de Jovenes Profesionales Cubanos and President of the Hispanic Law Students Association, Spring, “Step-Down Restitution: A Proposal For An Equitable Resolution To Confiscated Cuban Property” Nova Law Review, 32 Nova L. Rev. 423, lexis)

The public policy reasons for enacting a remediation policy with a restitution element far outweigh the legal conclusions from which such a policy can be launched. [R]estitution would have powerful symbolic value. It would mark the advent of a new post-socialist era. It would formally repudiate Marxist principles and schemes for state and collective ownership and recognize, even exalt, private property rights. It would provide a moral as well as legal condemnation of the past. In so doing, restitution would help a post-socialist Cuban government establish legitimacy in the eyes of the world community. This would dovetail neatly with current Western rhetoric and policy, which make progress toward "democracy" and a "free market economy" prerequisites for foreign as-sistance and support. Restitution would also advance the reconstitution of a Cuban national identity. It would allow Cuba to emerge from the rubble of the world communist "empire" with a clearer sense of nationhood and national purpose. It could promote reconnection with former citizens and ultimately lead to reintegration of emigres into a single community of Cuban nationals. Restitution could also help Cuba forge ties with the United States. Because of its proximity, wealth, and influence, the United States has the potential to play a major role in securing Cuba's economic future. Yet, until Cuba makes a meaningful effort to recognize and satisfy outstanding U.S. claims for nationalized property, the United States is likely to continue to impede rather than advance Cuban economic development. At the very least, Cuban support for restitution could signal its willingness to acknowledge and discuss U.S. claims. n160 Moreover, restitution should be the preferred remedy because "[a] transitional government in Havana . . . is not liable to have access to adequate financial resources to pay compensation" at a large scale. n161 Ironically, if Cuba were to prefer compensation, it would likely need to secure a favorable loan from the United States to make such payments and, when it is considered that most of the Cuban nationals that would receive such payments are residents of the United States and would not prefer compensation, the United States is not likely to grant the loan with the expectation of Cuba making those payments. n162 The community of Cuban Nationals and Cuban Americans armed with their newly restituted properties would likely be among the first to return to the island nation and seek business and investment opportunities and "jump-start" a newly established Cuban, free-market economy. n163 "However, if the property claims of the Cuban-American exile community are left unresolved, their political and economic power could be turned against stabilizing a new government in Cuba, much to the detriment not only of the island, but also to potentially fruitful Cuba-U.S. relations." n164